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I. INTRODUCTION
Ronald Coase’s classic article, The Problem of Social Cost,1 is
widely credited with playing a significant role in the development of
the economic analysis of law—one of the most influential new movements in legal scholarship in the last third of the twentieth century.
The traditional history here is that this impact came via two routes:
one, through the effect of Coase’s article in stimulating economists to
analyze issues that had traditionally been the province of legal scholars (that is, Coase as a stimulus for “economics imperialism”); and
* Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Colorado Denver; email:
steven.medema@ucdenver.edu. The author thanks Douglas Ayer, Guido Calabresi,
Marc Franklin, Herbert Hovenkamp, Frank Michelman, Richard Posner, and Pierre
Schlag for their comments on various parts of the discussion contained in this paper.
This research is supported by grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Institute for New Economic Thinking.
1. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [herinafter Coase, Social Cost].
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V2.I2.1
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two, through Coase’s impact on the thinking of Richard Posner, who
was moved to examine the efficiency of common law rules in part by
his encounter with Coase’s remarks regarding the propensity of judges
to make decisions that accorded with economists’ sensibilities.2 While
each of these historical claims is true enough, the lines of scholarship
that they reference commenced only in the 1970s. The genesis of the
application of Coase’s insights—and, in particular, the negotiation result that came to be known as the “Coase theorem”3—to legal issues
came in the first half of the 1960s, and significantly, the roots of this
work lie in the legal community, rather than the economics
community.
Economists began to work Coase’s negotiation result into their
analysis of externality-related market failures as early as 1962,4 and it
was not long before the lawyers, too, began to draw on this analysis—
particularly in the realm of tort law and the determination of liability
for accident-related costs. As we shall see, however, lawyers were
drawing on Coase’s negotiation result in other realms, as well as during the 1960s and, in the process, sowing the seeds of what was to
become the economic analysis of law. Beyond this, they were talking
about Coase’s negotiation result, both in terms of its theoretical domain and its implications, in rather different ways than were the economists during this period—differences that reflected both the
particular concerns of lawyers qua lawyers and the tensions involved
in the very early stages of working out how economic thinking might
inform legal analysis. This juxtaposition is indicative of the fact that
Coase’s negotiation result meant or implied different things to different audiences during the early stages of its diffusion into economic
and legal scholarship.
In spite of the tendency to attach the Coase theorem and the birth
of the economic analysis of law to the University of Chicago, the
spread of the Coase theorem in legal theory is not simply a Chicago
story—indeed, far from it—and even the Chicago aspects of this history are different than what one might expect. No one who has even a
nodding acquaintance with the history of law and economics should
dispute the notion that Yale’s Guido Calabresi was the driving force
behind the application of economic thinking, including the efficiency
2. Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics
at Chicago, 1932–1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 226 (1983). See also Coase, Social Cost,
supra note 1, at 22.
3. The author will use the terms “Coase theorem” and “Coase’s negotiation result” interchangeably here, relying mostly on the latter term. The term “Coase theorem” was not coined until 1966 and was not used in the legal literature until the 1970s.
See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966).
4. See Steven G. Medema, Rethinking Market Failure: “The Problem of Social
Cost” Before the ‘Coase Theorem’, (Jan. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188728 [hereinafter Medema,
Rethinking Market Failure].
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criterion, to tort law during the 1960s. His lengthy debate with Walter
Blum and Harry Kalven over accident law brought attention to the
challenge that economic thinking posed to certain traditional legal approaches, but it also helped to move Coase’s analysis onto the radar of
a broad spectrum of legal scholars, since The Problem of Social Cost
and the negotiation result were prominently referenced on both sides
of this debate.5
In the pages that follow, this Article will examine the diffusion of
Coase’s negotiation result in the legal literature during the 1960s. In
particular, the Article will focus on how the negotiation result posed a
challenge for received legal thinking, how Coase’s result related to far
older attempts to bring economic thinking to bear on the law, how
legal scholars utilized this result in their analysis, and how its treatment by legal scholars compares to that accorded it by economists
during this formative stage in the Coase theorem’s history. What will
emerge, in the end, is an enhanced understanding of how the Coase
theorem came to have a place in legal scholarship, as well as some
additional insight into this neglected epoch in the history of the economic analysis of law.
II. REVISITING COASE
The Problem of Social Cost is most well known for its elaboration of
the negotiation result that George Stigler later christened “the Coase
theorem.”6 Coase proposed that, viewed through the lens of economic theory, the absence of property rights over the resource in
question caused the basic problem of externalities (a term that Coase
despised and did not use). Using a simple, rather pastoral example of
a farmer whose crops are destroyed by a neighboring rancher’s roaming cattle, Coase claimed the problem was that there was no law specifying whether the farmer had the right to be free from harm or that
the rancher had the right to allow his cattle to roam where they
pleased.7 Coase demonstrated that, once such rights were assigned,
the efficient outputs of cattle and crops would obtain and that it did
not matter, from an allocative perspective, whether the relevant prop5. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution]; Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a Private
Law Problem: Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964) [hereinafter
Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem]; Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents]; Guido
Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE
L.J. 216 (1965) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven];
Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1967) [hereinafter Blum &
Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi].
6. STIGLER, supra note 3, at 111–13.
7. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 2–8.

162

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

erty rights were assigned to the rancher or the farmer.8 As Coase put
it:
It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or
not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial
delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which maximises
the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the
pricing system is assumed to work without cost.9

This is the result that came to be known as the Coase theorem. As set
out by Coase, the result turns on two key assumptions and embodies
two central results. The key assumptions are that rights are fully specified and transaction costs are zero.10 The results are that the externality will be resolved efficiently (the efficiency proposition), in the
sense of maximizing the value of output, and that the outcome will be
invariant under alternative assignments of rights (the invariance proposition, or allocative neutrality).11 Each one of these assumptions
and results later became the subject of controversy.12
There were some two dozen citations to The Problem of Social Cost
made by legal scholars during the 1960s, with the first coming in
1964—roughly three years after Coase’s article appeared in print.13
The areas of legal analysis to which Coase’s article was deemed relevant ranged across automobile accidents, products liability, land-use
controversies, the equitable-lien doctrine, governmental takings of
private property, price regulation, landlord-tenant relationships, the
allocation of the frequency spectrum, and airport congestion.14 While
not all of these references to Coase’s analysis were in the context of
his negotiation result, a large share of them were—a fact that suggests
lawyers were very quick to pick up on the potential relevance of this
idea for legal reasoning.15
8. Id.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 15. Coase did not offer a formal definition of transaction costs, but he
described them thus:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of
the contract are being observed, and so on.
Id.
11. Id.
12. See generally Steven G. Medema & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr, The Coase Theorem,
in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 836 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
De Geest eds., 2000) (discussing the debates over the theoretical validity of the Coase
theorem).
13. Though carrying an October 1960 publication date, the issue of the Journal of
Law and Economics in which Coase’s article was published did not appear until early
1961. Coase, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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When Coase applied his negotiation result to a series of legal cases
in The Problem of Social Cost, the domain of his analysis was very
truncated.16 His lens was trained squarely on disputes between owners of adjoining parcels of property—cases involving two parties
whose use interests in their respective parcels of property were in conflict due to noise, smell, etc.17 Though a handful of the invocations of
Coase’s negotiation result by lawyers during the 1960s were of this
type, the vast majority lay elsewhere. The most frequent applications,
in fact, were to automobile-accident law and products liability. In order to get at the diffusion of the Coase theorem in the legal arena, it is
useful to begin with its entry point: automobile-accident law and the
debate between Guido Calabresi of Yale, Walter Blum, and Harry
Kalven of Chicago over the utility of applying economic analysis to
this topic—a debate that brought the Coase theorem into legal
scholarship.18
III. TAKING THE COASE THEOREM FOR A DRIVE: THE EARLY
ECONOMICS OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LAW
It should not surprise the reader to find that the Coase theorem
entered the legal literature via the University of Chicago, but its actual source of entry into this literature has not been remarked upon in
the histories of law and economics. The origin, as it happens, lies in a
1964 article on accident law, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem, authored by University of Chicago Law School professors
Walter Blum and Harry Kalven.19 Blum, whose research focused
heavily on taxation, was certainly aware of the potential for economic
thinking to influence legal analysis. He had taken Henry Simons’s economics course in the law school while a student at Chicago during
the 1940s and, along with fellow law school professors Kalven, Wilbur
Katz, Malcolm Sharp, and Aaron Director (who replaced Simons as
the economist on the Chicago law faculty following Simons’s death in
the mid-1940s), formed a small economics-related reading and discussion group—a group that at times included the participation of Milton
Friedman.20 And, of course, tax law had for some time had an interdisciplinary flavor in which economic reasoning played a part. Kalven
seems to have been less disposed to economics than was Blum,21 but
Henry Manne reports that Kalven’s torts class in the 1950s had a sig16. Id. at 8–15.
17. See generally id.
18. See generally Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra note 5; Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5; Calabresi, The
Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, supra note 5.
19. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra
note 5.
20. Kitch, supra note 2, at 168, 179, 186.
21. This sentiment was echoed by Calabresi in a conversation with this author.
Interview with Guido Calabresi (July 6, 2011) [hereinafter Interview].
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nificant infusion of economics,22 the result of an evolution in his thinking that Blum later ascribed to Kalven’s participation in the reading
group.23 To understand how Blum and Kalven came to the application of economic analysis to questions of accident law and, in particular, to invoking Coase’s negotiation result, we need to step back to
examine some of the background against which their article was written—specifically, Guido Calabresi’s 1961 Yale Law Journal article,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts.24
Calabresi’s article is well known for its proposition that the focus of
tort law should move away from a fault-based liability system to one
in which liability is placed on the party in the best position to avoid
the harm—the case for which Calabresi attempted to ground in economic reasoning. But this move did not arise in a vacuum. Calabresi
had studied economics as an undergraduate at Yale and as a Rhodes
Scholar at Oxford before moving on to Yale Law School, where economics-infused legal realism had a long, if by then greatly weakened,
tradition. Calabresi’s economics training at Yale and Oxford included
work with (then) present or future giants of the profession, such as
William Fellner, James Tobin, John Hicks, and Lawrence Klein (the
last three of whom would later receive the Nobel Prize in economics).25 But Calabresi’s interest in applying economic analysis to law
was sparked in Fleming James’s torts course in the law school—a
course that, as he was to later remark, raised many questions of an
economic nature, particularly regarding risk spreading.26 James himself knew little about economics, according to Calabresi, but Calabresi
found the answers to many of these questions “obvious,” given his
economics training.27 Calabresi took up the challenge of dealing with
some of these questions from an economic perspective around 1957,
when he first drafted the paper that would become Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts for a Yale Law Journal editorial-board competition.28 It was only some years later that he offered
a somewhat revised version of the paper to the journal for publication,
22. Kitch, supra note 2, at 184.
23. Id. at 186.
24. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 5.
25. Interview, supra note 21. Calabresi had his introductory economics from Warren Nutter, who had received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and became
one of the founders of the “Virginia School” of political economy. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Schulman and James text utilized in James’s tort course was developed
in part from materials originally put together by Walton Hamilton and Schulman. See
Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736 (2005) [hereinafter Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited]; HARRY SHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1952). Hamilton, of course, was a prominent economist of the institutionalist persuasion, and it was the Hamilton link, says
Calabresi, that was the source of the treatment of cost-related material in a way that
suggested the relevance of economics. Interview, supra note 21.
28. Interview, supra note 21; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra
note 5.
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as a result of which it, and Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost, were
published within weeks of each other in the spring of 1961.29
A. Calabresi and the Simple Economics of Tort Law
Calabresi’s analysis in Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts centered on the proposition from “traditional economic
theory” that “the most desirable system of loss distribution under a
strict resource-allocation theory is one in which the prices of goods
accurately reflect their full cost to society.”30 This requirement, that
the prices of goods reflect all relevant costs, is a necessary condition
for allocative efficiency in the welfare economics literature.31 The violation of this requirement is evidenced in various phenomena, including externalities—situations where the actions of one party impact
others in a way that is not reflected in the prices faced by agents who
are party to the activity—of the sort that would give rise to tort
claims.32 The application of this welfare principle to torts, said Calabresi, entails that the costs of a harm-causing activity be internalized
to the activity causing the harm, and that the process of internalization
should assign that cost to the party or to that activity that can best
ensure this cost is reflected in the price of the good in question.33 This
insight, of course, provided the basis for the least-cost-avoider rule
being advocated by Calabresi in his analysis of tort liability.
Although his 1961 article was grounded in the claim that economics
could, and should, provide the basis for the allocation of accident
costs, Calabresi made no bones about his sense that, in the determination of the party on whom to place tort liability in order to achieve the
desired efficient outcome, “traditional economic theory is of little
help.”34 The problem, he said, is that “in the economist’s world it often
makes no difference whether, for example, the cost of an injury is put
on a worker or on his employer.”35 If employers were liable for harm,
they would offer the workers wage terms that were correspondingly
reduced; whereas if the employees were liable, they would demand
higher wages to cover the cost of acquiring insurance or of self-insuring.36 “Either way,” said Calabresi, the theory states that “the cost
would find its way into wages and into prices.”37 Thus, “[f]rom the
standpoint of resource allocations—though perhaps only from that
standpoint—nothing would be changed” by assigning liability to one
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, supra note 27, at 737–38; Coase, supra note 1.
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 5, at 505.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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party rather than the other.38 Economic analysis was unhelpful, then,
because it did not provide law with any guidance for assigning liability
to one party as against the other.39
The notion that the allocation of resources is not affected by the
assignment of liability as between employer and employee sounds suspiciously like an application of the Coase theorem—a subject to which
we shall return shortly.40 For the moment, though, what bears emphasizing is that Calabresi was not willing to lend a great deal of credence
to the economist’s theoretical claims about the invariant effects of alternative liability assignments, labeling previous attempts to apply this
theory to the context of workplace accidents as “inaccurate.”41 The
problem, he said, is that this theory “presupposes an all knowing, all
rational economic world which does not exist.”42 It goes almost without saying, of course, that this criticism anticipated an argument that
would be leveled against the Coase theorem with great frequency in
the coming decades. In reality, Calabresi argued, some assignments of
risk do not allow for the transfer of the relevant costs into prices, parties may evaluate risk differently, and the rates at which parties are
able to insure against risk may differ.43 Each of these factors, in turn,
will cause a variation in prices, and thus incentives, across alternative
assignments of liability and will thereby give rise to outcomes that
vary with the assignment of liability.44
That said, Calabresi did allow that the traditional economic view of
the problem is relevant—that there are situations “where it actually
does not matter who bears the loss initially.”45 As examples, Calabresi
cited the utilization of independent contractors and products liability
cases that involve commercial buyers and sellers because these may
represent situations in which each party is able to allocate the relevant
38. Id. at 506 n.25.
39. See id. at 506.
40. In fact, economist James Chelius made exactly this connection some two decades later in an article on the influence of workers’ compensation rules on safety
incentives. See generally James R. Chelius, The Influence of Workers’ Compensation
on Safety Incentives, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 235 (1982).
41. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 5, at 506 & n.23
(citing economists Frank Taussig of Harvard and Harry Gunnison Brown as representative of the received view. F.W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 326–27
(1912)). See also Harry G. Brown, The Incidence of Compulsory Insurance of Workmen, 30 J. POL. ECON. 67 (1922). Taussig’s treatise was widely utilized as a textbook
in the first third of the twentieth century. See Joseph A. Schumpter, Frank William
Taussig, 55 Q. J. ECON. 337, 351 (1941).
42. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 5, at 506.
43. See, e.g., id. (arguing that making pedestrians liable for auto-pedestrian accidents will not increase the price of cars and so will not have a deterrent effect on
automobile purchases—a factor that also contributes to the accidents).
44. See generally id.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
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cost to the appropriate activity or product.46 He was clearly of the
mind, though, that the scope for such arrangements is quite limited,
and thus the traditional economic theory was not likely to apply.47 In
such cases, he said, the assignment of liability should not be a matter
of indifference, and efficiency considerations dictate that the cost burden be imposed on the party who is “in a better position to allocate
the cost of the particular loss to the appropriate activity or
merchandise.”48
Calabresi, then, appears to have laid out his own “Coase theorem”
type result at roughly the same time that Coase was making his point
in The Problem of Social Cost.49 Calabresi’s presentation of this result, however—as one that was well-established in the economics literature rather than as an original idea—stands in stark contrast to the
incredulity and resistance with which Coase’s analysis was met in
many quarters, including among economists. But Calabresi also
seemed to be giving rather little scope, even in theory, to the allocative invariance result, limiting it to a far more narrow set of contexts
than Coase himself was then contemplating when laying out his own
analysis and certainly only a shadow of what was to come in terms of
the application of Coase’s insights at the hands of others. To get additional insight into whether and how Coase’s analysis was original and
the extent to which it was adding new insights to legal theory, it appears further exploration is needed.
B.

Questioning Coase at Chicago

It is not widely appreciated that the first citation to The Problem of
Social Cost and Coase’s negotiation result to emerge from the University of Chicago economics faculty did not occur until October 1964,
when Harold Demsetz published an article on The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights in the Journal of Law and Economics.50
The first reference to The Problem of Social Cost and Coase’s negotia46. See id. at 545–47. Calabresi even allowed that this reasoning may apply to
modern “workmen’s compensation” situations, given the development of strong labor
unions in some industries and the potential that they could function as more effective
bargaining units than could individual workers. Id. at 506 n.25.
47. Id. at 545–48.
48. Id. at 506–07.
49. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 5;
Coase, Social Cost supra note 1. Of course, Coase had argued this point already in
1959, which led to the writing of his 1960 article. See Ronald H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) [hereinafter Coase, The Federal Communications Commission]. See, for example, STEVEN G. MEDEMA, THE
HESITANT HAND: TAMING SELF-INTEREST IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC IDEAS
(2009); Kitch, supra note 2 for a discussion of the relationship between The Federal
Communications Commission and The Problem of Social Cost. Calabresi, however,
had not seen either of Coase’s articles prior to penning his own piece. Interview,
supra note 21.
50. Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. &
ECON. 11, 12 n.1 (1964).
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tion result to come out of the law school, however, actually occurred
several months earlier, in Walter Blum and Harry Kalven’s article,
Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem: Auto Compensation Plans. This article was published in the University of Chicago
Law Review in the summer of 1964 and was based on the Schulman
Lectures that they delivered at Yale in February of that year.51 Coase
himself did not arrive at the University of Chicago until 1964,52 having
twice in the previous decade turned down offers to move there—first
from the University of Buffalo and then from the University of Virginia.53 Given this timeline, the early diffusion of Coase’s negotiation
result at Chicago cannot be explained by Coase’s presence on the
faculty and instead would seem to owe to the attractiveness of, or
challenge posed by, this idea and the felt need to take it and its implications into account when thinking about externality-related economic and legal problems.
Blum and Kalven’s larger goal in Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem was to “explor[e] the underlying rationale of tort
liability and compensation schemes,” with automobile accident law
providing a “test” for their theory against other contenders.54 Blum
and Kalven’s preferred approach to the problem reflected their respective backgrounds: Kalven, the professor of tort law and co-author
of a textbook on the subject,55 and Blum, the professor of tax law,
were advocating a structure that would combine a tort liability system
with a system of social insurance that provided compensation for accident victims.56 Such a system, they argued, would have the effect of
holding liable those whose actions caused the accidents while providing full and swift compensation to accident victims.57
While evaluating how their proposed system stacked up against alternative standards and systems, Blum and Kalven took up the question of how the economist would approach the question of liability
and compensation for accidents, noting that it had become a “fashionable” perspective from which to examine these issues.58 This, of
51. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra
note 5, at 641 n.1, 699 n.130. Shulman, of course, was the co-author of the textbook
from which Calabresi had learned tort law under Fleming James. See supra, note 27
and accompanying text.
52. Kitch, supra note 2, at 212.
53. Id. at 219.
54. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra
note 5, at 642.
55. CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS (2d ed. 1959).
56. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra
note 5, at 722.
57. Id. In contrast, a rule such as negligence, by awarding compensation only if
the other party was negligent, would not provide compensation for many accidents,
and even then only with a long delay as the case wound its way through the legal
system.
58. Id. at 692.
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course, brought them squarely into conflict with Calabresi’s economic
arguments for a least-cost-avoider rule, but it also led them to bring
Coase’s negotiation result directly into the discussion—and in a way
that sheds some light on the questions related to the originality of
Coase’s contribution and its relation to Calabresi’s analysis, noted
above.59
Like Calabresi, Blum and Kalven associated the economic approach
to the problem with the question of efficiency, here taken to mean
that all relevant costs are reflected in prices. Such prices ensure that
agents will make appropriate choices with regard to the goods and
services they produce or consume, and that these goods and services
are produced in the most efficient manner.60 To analyze how economics would apply to questions of liability, they instanced a situation in
which the face of a wristwatch dial contains radioactive material that
causes skin damage to some individuals who wear these watches.61
The economist, they suggested, would assess the liability question by
pointing to impacts: if the manufacturer is not made liable for this
harm, the consumer will bear the costs.62 If, on the other hand, the
watch manufacturer is made liable for damage, the increased costs to
the manufacturer will be translated into higher prices, meaning the
consumer will bear the cost in the end.63 That is, the economist would
argue that the assignment of liability has no impact on the allocation
of costs, making it a matter of indifference, from an efficiency perspective, who is made liable.64 Like Calabresi, Blum and Kalven
found the economist’s analysis of the problem of little use when it
came to guiding decisions regarding the assignment of liability.65 But
they also joined Calabresi in contending that the economist’s story
regarding invariant allocations will not always translate well into realworld situations, owing to the problems with mapping the frictionless
world of economics onto the real world.66
For Blum and Kalven, even granting the applicability of the economist’s logic to the watch-dial case did not resolve the issue at hand.67
The problem, they argued, is that this logic does not translate well to
automobile accidents, where, unlike in the watch-dial case, not all of
the involved parties are in an existing market or bargaining relationship, and thus not all costs get translated into prices faced by the relevant parties.68 Auto–pedestrian accidents, they pointed out, are the
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
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699–706.
695–96.
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696–97.

at 697–98.
at 698–99.
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consequence of the actions of both parties.69 But if liability is placed
on victims, the costs to pedestrians who do not own cars will not be
transferred into the marketplace for automobiles and driving-related
activities. Also, placing liability on drivers will not lead to increased
costs for pedestrians.70 As such, agents could not be expected to adjust their behavior in ways that would generate the efficient results
contemplated by the economist.71 Even in the case of accidents
caused by automobile defects, they noted, the existence of a bargaining relationship between manufacturer and consumers is not sufficient
to efficiently transfer costs into prices, given that the class of accident
victims goes well beyond purchasers of automobiles (to include, e.g.,
pedestrians).72 Blum and Kalven were thus led to conclude that it
may well make a difference, from an efficiency perspective, where liability is assigned.73 But the further problem that arises in these cases,
they said, is that economics cannot tell us whether assigning liability to
drivers or victims will result in a smaller distortion.74
All of this, said Blum and Kalven, would seem to leave us at “an
impasse where we cannot use the economist’s criteria to resolve our
liability issue.”75 It was at this point, however, that they suggested
that “[r]ecent economic theorizing, associated with the name of Ronald Coase, might alter the picture.”76 Coase, they said, had challenged
the long-held assumption that “in the situations where law had a
choice of placing a cost on an activity or of leaving it as an externality
to that activity, the decision would inevitably affect the allocation of
resources.”77 His insight, as they interpreted it, was as follows:
Coase has argued that if the actors and victims—that is, the relevant
parties—are free to negotiate with each other and there are no inhibiting costs in bargaining, the result of these negotiations will be
the same allocation of resources regardless of where the law places
the cost.78

The implication of this, according to Blum and Kalven, was that any
tort situation becomes akin to the watch-dial example, meaning that
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. Unlike Calabresi, Blum and Kalven made no references to the economics
literature here. Indeed, the only references to the economics literature in their article
are to Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost and to a working paper by University of
Chicago economist Simon Rottenberg—the latter reference going to issues of incentives and efficiency in the legal realm. Id. at 699 n.130, 702 n.134.
75. Id. at 699.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 699–700.
78. Id. at 700.
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“[i]nsofar as [Coase’s] analysis holds, . . . the law cannot make a serious mistake in an economic sense in its choice of liability rule.”79
But Blum and Kalven still could not get fully on board with the
economist’s prescription. The problem with Coase’s analysis, they argued, was once again the collision between economic theory and reality—that the negotiation result is unlikely to apply to auto accident
situations.80 Specifically, they said, “[i]t is extremely awkward to imagine motorists and potential victims negotiating about their patterns
of activity, and it would seem near fantasy to imagine what the terms
of any bargain between them might be.”81 As a result, they concluded, we cannot assume that, whatever decision is made by the
courts, the result will be an outcome that generates the efficient allocation of resources.82
It is worthwhile to step back at this point and consider why Blum
and Kalven invoked Coase’s negotiation result in the case of auto accidents but not in the watch-dial example, which, on the face of it,
appears to be more or less identical.83 Though Blum and Kalven did
not take up this subject explicitly,84 the answer seems to lie in the
contexts in which the two tort situations emerge. In the watch-dial
case, the context is that of an established market between buyers and
sellers of a product—in this case, watches—where, according to a halfcentury of economic theory, prices will adjust to take account of factors germane to the cost or valuation of the good, including all costs
associated with its production.85 Buyers and sellers here interact
within a forum, the market, that allows for costs to be registered in the
marketplace. Consumers demand lower prices when they are forced
to bear costs associated with product-related harms, and sellers charge
higher prices when liability falls on them.86 The effect, in the end, is
that the net prices paid by buyers and received by sellers are identical
across the alternative assignments of liability—at least in theory.87
In the case of auto accidents, however, there is no regularized
mechanism—akin to the function performed by the market in the
watch-dial example—for many of the potential accident costs to be
79. Id. at 696, 700.
80. Id. at 700.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 701–02.
83. Id. at 696.
84. See further discussion of Calabresi infra pp. 173–75.
85. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra
note 5, at 696–97.
86. The market logic here is no different from that which explains why a home
with an ocean view will sell for a higher price than an identical home situated two
blocks inland.
87. George Stigler was to note two years later that this “Coase theorem” result is
no different than that of the incidence of a sales tax, which, in theory, is identical
regardless of whether the tax is formally levied on buyers or sellers. See STIGLER,
supra note 3, at 113.

172

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

translated into prices.88 What Coase had shown, according to Blum
and Kalven, was that parties not directly linked through the marketplace could potentially negotiate efficient agreements related to the
costs of harmful acts, and that the resulting outcomes would not be
affected by the associated liability regime in the shadow of which the
negotiation took place.89 In the case of auto accidents, however, such
negotiations are problematic, as noted above, and this led Blum and
Kalven to conclude that allocation will indeed be impacted by the
court’s decision on liability.90
Blum and Kalven’s hesitancy about what economics can or should
add to law went well beyond finding Coase’s negotiation result problematic. For example, they questioned whether the “prices” imposed
by legal rules serve a deterrent function and whether efficiency (as
opposed to “justice,” traditionally conceived) is an appropriate goal
for law.91 But for present purposes, what is germane is that Blum and
Kalven were willing to countenance the application of Coase’s result
to legal analysis, even if they found it wanting in the end when it came
to the subject of automobile accidents.
What remains unclear in all of this is why Blum and Kalven were
led to invoke Coase’s analysis in the first place. Unfortunately,
neither Blum and Kalven’s text nor the archival evidence has yielded
any clues.92 Though Coase had not yet arrived at Chicago,93 it could
well be that his argument was “in the air” around the law school during this period, and Blum and Kalven may have realized the potential
to connect Coase to this line of reasoning after reading Calabresi’s
remarks about the economist’s long-established views on the invariant
effects of alternative liability rules in the marketplace. What is interesting about Blum and Kalven’s discussion, though, is not simply that
they brought Coase’s analysis into the story, but that they were willing
to make a leap beyond what Coase had done, in that Coase’s analysis
was confined to conflicting-use cases where the parties involved were
in constant and close proximity to one another—a very different context than that associated with automobile accidents.94 What led Blum
and Kalven to make this contextual leap? At this point, unfortunately, we can do little more than conjecture.

88. See Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra
note 5, at 698–99.
89. Id. at 700.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 700–01.
92. See generally Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra note 5.
93. Kitch, supra note 2, at 212.
94. See generally Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra note 5.
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Calabresi Redux

Blum and Kalven’s discussion, then, provides some insight into the
questions of whether and how Coase’s negotiation analysis offered
something new to the law95 and into the attendant question of
whether Calabresi’s 1961 article, in effect, offered its own “Coase theorem,” albeit as a well-established result rather than a new theory.96
Some further insight into these issues, and into Calabresi’s rationale
for limiting the achievement of efficient and invariant allocations to
accidents involving independent contractors and certain products liability situations, can be found in his 1965 article, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, published in the
Harvard Law Review.97
It was in The Decision for Accidents that Calabresi first brought
Coase’s analysis into his own discussion and, at the same time, clarified what had been only implicit in Blum and Kalven and in his own
discussion of market solutions in Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts.98 In The Decision for Accidents, Calabresi emphasized that what allows markets to, in theory at least, deal satisfactorily with harmful effects in certain contexts—e.g., workers’
compensation or products liability—is the presence of a pre-existing or
ongoing contractual relationship that can be modified to account for
the harmful effect or the potential for one.99 The underlying intuition
here is that where a marketplace relationship already exists, the forces
of supply and demand will work to internalize the relevant costs associated with the risk of accidents, and there is scope—in theory at
least—for the market to generate an efficient and invariant result.100
But again, this was an insight that, as Calabresi emphasized, had long
been recognized in the economics literature.101
In bringing Coase into the story, however, Calabresi ascribed to him
the insight that the same efficiency and invariance results that we observe in “bargaining situations” (Calabresi’s term for the pre-existing
bargaining relationship) can emerge from the much wider class of situations in which no pre-existing market or contractual relationship obtains—as in the case of automobile accidents.102 Calabresi’s
interpretation of Coase’s insight is worth quoting in full:
Recently, it has been ably argued that the same reasoning may apply in a great variety of situations in which a bargaining or contractual relationship does not exist between the potential original
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 700.
Id. at 706.
Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5.
Id.; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 5.
Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5, at 725–32.
See id.
See id. at 717–18.
Id. at 729.
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bearers of the accident cost. The argument runs that if the cost of a
factory-smoke nuisance, for instance, is put on the homeowner
rather than on the factory, and the cheapest way to avoid this cost is
not for the homeowner to move or wear a gasmask but is for the
factory to install a smoke-clearing device or cut down production,
the homeowner will pay the factory to do this. On the other hand, if
the cost is originally put on the factory, and the best way to minimize the loss is to get the homeowners to move, the factory will find
it cheaper to pay for such a move rather than to cut down production. Either way, it is argued, the market will find the cheapest way
to deter or minimize the loss. And while there may be some difference in the end as to who is richer and who is poorer, in terms of
general cost deterrence the same results will be achieved whoever
bears the initial loss.103

What Coase had shown, so far as Calabresi was concerned, was that “a
bargaining relationship can always be established” between the party
on whom the loss originally falls and the party who is best positioned
to minimize the loss, and that “[i]n a perfect world such a bargaining
relationship will always result in appropriate minimization of the
loss,” just as in the case of the pre-existing bargaining relationship.104
That said, the possibilities associated with actually applying Coase’s
analysis to the context of accidents apparently were sufficiently remote for Calabresi in 1965 that he did not attempt to offer an illustration of a situation in which Coase’s negotiation result might be put to
use, even in theory.105 Instead, Calabresi turned immediately to an
elaboration of what he saw as the problems associated with making
use of Coase’s result, placing particular emphasis on the cost of establishing a market/bargaining relationship in the first place, and on freeriding behavior that he felt was likely to emerge in such contexts.106
The practical problems associated with working out Coasean solutions were not Calabresi’s only concern, however.107 He also thought
that he had spotted a logical flaw in Coase’s analysis.108 Though Calabresi was on board with Coase’s negotiation result as far as it went, it
was not clear to him that Coase’s efficiency and invariance claims
would hold up in the long run.109 The issue, he said, is that, in the long
103. Id.
104. Id. at 730 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also Guido Calabresi,
Changes for Automobile Claims? Views and Overviews, 1967 U. ILL. LEGAL F. 600,
607 (1967) [hereinafter Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims?] (stating that
Coase had shown, “in theory, any ‘independent’ situation can be transformed into a
bargaining situation”). It is worth noting that Coase himself had made no reference
to those situations where a bargaining relationship already exits, and it was Calabresi
who first pointed out the essential similarity between this older result and Coase’s
insight.
105. But see Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims?, supra note 104, at 607–08.
106. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5, at 730–31.
107. Id. at 730 n.28.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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run, the different flows of payments that accompany alternative assignments of liability will affect relative profits and thereby the incentives for entry into and exit from those industries in the long run.110
If, for example, manufacturers were held liable for damage caused to
farmers by the pollution of water used for irrigation, these higher
costs for manufacturers would reduce manufacturing profitability relative to that in farming, meaning that resources would flow out of manufacturing and perhaps also into farming.111 The converse would be
true if the farmers were liable for the harm.112 These entry and exit
effects, in turn, would alter relative goods prices, the effect of which
would be to generate asymmetric levels of output across alternative
assignments of liability—thereby negating Coase’s invariance claim.113
Moreover, the fact that these new output levels would diverge from
the original efficient-negotiated outputs suggested to Calabresi that
Coase’s efficiency claim could not be sustained, either.114
This critique required some thoughtful engagement with the economic theory underlying Coase’s negotiation result—something other
legal scholars and precious few economist commentators had cared to
undertake to this point115—and reinforces our sense that Calabresi
took the negotiation result quite seriously as a proposition with some
bearing on legal issues rather viewing it simply as a theoretical curiosity. And, as we have already seen, Calabresi’s economics training had
not blinded him to the practical problems involved in moving from the
frictionless world of economic theory to the imperfect market and exchange relationships of (legal-)economic reality. The force of these
imperfections, both in the pre-existing bargaining case and in Coasean
situations of independent agents, combined with his concerns about
the long-run logic of Coase’s negotiation result, led Calabresi to conclude that, “for both theoretical and practical reasons, . . . there are
many situations in which we cannot assume that it makes no difference, in terms of accident deterrence, who is saddled with the original
liability.”116 This sense is confirmed by Calabresi in his critique of
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id. The entry/exit critique gained some currency among economists, who
raised this issue independently in the mid-1960s. See, e.g., David F. Bramhall & Edwin S. Mills, A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and Payments, 2 WATER RESOURCES RES. 615, 616 (1966). Bramhall and Mills built their challenge on a similar
one laid down in Morton Kamien, Nancy L. Schwartz, & F. T. Dolbear, Asymmetry
Between Bribes and Charges, 2 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 147 (1966). David F.
Bramhall & Edwin S. Mills, A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and Payments, 2
WATER RESOURCES RES. 615, 615 (1966).
114. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5, at 730 n.28.
115. The exception on the critic front was Columbia University economist Stanislaw Wellisz. See Stanislaw Wellisz, On External Diseconomies and the GovernmentAssisted Invisible Hand, 31 ECONOMICA 345 (1964).
116. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5, at 731.
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Blum and Kalven, published several months after The Decision for
Accidents, where he noted that one area in which they seemed to be in
agreement was in feeling that the “practical limitations” attending
bargains of the type envisioned by Coase “are significant enough to
preclude their being the answer.”117 It is safe to conclude, then, that,
circa 1965, Calabresi was of the mind that Coase’s analysis had added
little, if anything, to the discussion of practical accident remedies.
Even so, Calabresi was disappointed that Coase’s result, which he
labeled “ingenious,” could not be put to practical use.118 This was not
because, were Coase’s negotiation result applicable, we could then be
indifferent about assignments of liability. Indeed, Calabresi was
never, even in theory, indifferent about assignments of liability. Instead, his thinking was more instrumentally oriented: his view was that
“were Coase’s theory frequently workable, the guidelines for liability
derived in the [pre-existing] bargaining case”—factors such as which
party is the better risk bearer or which party can insure more cheaply
against liability—“would apply here as well.”119 The reasoning behind
this statement becomes clear when one realizes that, in Calabresi’s
world, getting to efficiency is a multi-step process. The first step is to
assign liability to those parties (that class of agents—drivers, pedestrians, etc.) who can most cheaply internalize the relevant costs—i.e., the
least-cost avoiders.120 The second step is that these costs must be
translated into the prices faced by all agents so that they can appropriately adjust their behavior.121 On Calabresi’s reading, what Coase had
provided was the key to unlocking this second step in the absence of
an existing bargaining/market relationship: the establishment of liability allows for the creation of a market framework for interaction that
was not previously present.122 But if the costs of establishing such a
market are too high, as Calabresi expected they generally would be,
there is no mechanism for transmitting the relevant costs into each of
the prices faced by each of the affected parties, and as a result, the
costs are not internalized in a way that will generate efficient outcomes.123 If the establishment of liability ensured the creation of a
bargaining relationship, then the transference of costs into price
would also be ensured. In such circumstances, the only issue for efficiency would be to ensure that liability is assigned to the party who
117. Calabresi, The Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, supra note 5, at 231
n.28. That the dispute between Blum and Kalven on the one hand and Calabresi on
the other did not go to the validity of Coase’s negotiation result is reflected in Blum
and Kalven’s 1967 rebuttal to Calabresi. See Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of
Dr. Calabresi, supra note 5, at 264 n.53.
118. Calabresi, The Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, supra note 5, at 231.
119. Id. at 231 n.28.
120. Id. at 232.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 231–32 n.28.
123. Id. at 232.
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can internalize the harm at lowest cost—toward which the above-enumerated factors would provide guidance, just as in the case of a preexisting bargaining relationship.124 But alas, Calabresi considered this
prospect extremely remote.125
The reader may well be perplexed by the fact that Calabresi did not
seem to follow Coase here in allowing that any assignment of liability
will generate an efficient outcome—that is, why Calabresi felt it necessary to assign rights to the least-cost avoider when Coase had argued that efficiency is guaranteed in any case. The answer goes to a
significant distinction between the contexts within which Calabresi
and Coase were conducting their respective analyses. When closely
reading Calabresi’s discussion of tort remedies, including Coasean solutions, one thing that stands out is that his discussion was consistently
conducted on a large numbers/market level. Calabresi’s “Coase theorem” was not one that involved, or at least focused on, the two-party,
bilateral-exchange context of Coase’s farmer and cattle rancher or of
the physician and the confectioner in Sturges v. Bridgman, where the
two agents negotiate an efficient and invariant outcome in the shadow
of the law regardless of how rights are assigned.126 Instead, the parties
involved are the class of injurers and the class of victims, as seen most
prominently in his discussions of automobile manufacturers, drivers
and pedestrians, farmers and cattle ranchers, and the like.127 Calabresi was speaking of the possibilities and problematics of the internalization of accident costs within a market process involving these
classes of agents, and his quest was for legal rules that would internalize costs to the relevant class(es) of actors in a way that minimizes
accident-related costs.128
This, then, brings us to the crux of Calabresi’s interest in Coase’s
result and, indeed, his conceptualization of Coase’s insight in The
Problem of Social Cost: for Calabresi, Coase’s analysis said that where
124. Id. at 226.
125. Id.
126. Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852, (1883), 32 Reports of Cases Decided by the English Courts 837.
127. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 5;
Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5; Calabresi, The Wonderful World
of Blum and Kalven, supra note 5.
128. See Calabresi, The Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, supra note 5, at 231.
There is one other interesting point of departure between Calabresi and Coase at this
stage. Whereas Coase assumed that transacting was costless in formulating his negotiation result, Calabresi presents the reader with a Coasean framework within which
“the cost of establishing such relationships is not too great”—that is, he allowed for
non-zero costs of transacting. See id. at 231 n.28. This, of course had the effect of
adding a dose of realism to Coase’s original result, given that the costs of transacting
in the real world are always positive. But it had the problematic aspect of being incorrect, in the sense that an invariant outcome is not assured (or even likely) if transaction costs are non-zero. We must bear in mind, however, that all of this was very early
in the history of the discussions of the Coase theorem, and the notion of transaction
costs, their nature, and their impact was still very much in its infancy.
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a market does not exist to internalize costs, the assignment of liability
will have the effect of creating a set of market or market-like interconnections between classes of agents that will cause relevant costs to be
reflected in the prices faced by all agents—in the case of automobiles,
for example, all drivers and all pedestrians.129 It was a theoretical
complement to the pre-existing-bargaining-relationship situations,
e.g., products liability and workers’ compensation—one that ensured
that the proper legal regime would internalize expected costs to all
potential injurers and potential victims in a way that would minimize
the cost of accidents. Unfortunately, though, this result was, for Calabresi, little more than an interesting fiction.
D. From Interesting Fiction to Useful Fiction: Calabresi’s
Resurrection of Coase
Even with his extensive economics background, however, Calabresi
did not quite get it right in his 1965 entry/exit-based challenge to
Coase’s analysis, as he himself admitted in a brief article on this subject, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules—A
Comment, published in the Journal of Law and Economics in 1968.130
On what basis did Calabresi retract his earlier criticism of Coase’s negotiation result? In essence, he invoked the Coase theorem in defense
of the Coase theorem by arguing that “the same type of transactions
which cured the short run misallocation would also occur to cure the
long run ones.”131 If, after entry and exit effects, the output of one
industry—say, farming—is too low, relative to the other—say, manufacturing—“those who lose from this ‘misallocation’ would have every
reason to bribe farmers to produce more and factories to produce
129. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5, at 730–31. This largenumbers/small-numbers distinction explains other aspects of Calabresi’s analysis as
well, including his emphasis on the costs of establishing a market and on the prospect
of free-riding within the negotiation process. Neither of these issues is relevant to
Coase’s bilateral bargaining situation. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents,
supra note 5, at 730–31; Calabresi, The Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, supra
note 5, at 231 n.28; Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 n.5 (1968) [hereinafter Calabresi,
Transaction Costs]. Calabresi was well aware of the fact that his conception of transaction costs, with its emphasis on the costs of establishing a market, differed significantly from that of Coase (who focused on the costs associated with the negotiation
process itself), though he never made a connection between their respective emphases
and the distinction between the large-numbers character of his own analysis and the
small-numbers character of Coase’s. See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 129,
at 68 n.5; Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 15.
130. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 129. By this time, the Journal of Law
and Economics was being edited by Coase. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, Ronald H.
Coase—Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/eco
nomic-sciences/laureates/1991/coase-bio.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). Calabresi
thanked both Coase and his Yale Law School colleague, Ward Bowman, himself a
Chicago product, for discussions related to various aspects of this note. Calabresi,
Transaction Costs, supra note 129, at 67 n.*.
131. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 129, at 67.

2014]

DEBATING LAW’S IRRELEVANCE

179

less,” a process that, he said, would continue until the misallocation
had been fully corrected.132
However, Calabresi was not content to stop at this. Instead, he
pushed the envelope even further by claiming that, at least in theory,
Coase’s negotiation result has applicability going well beyond externalities.133 What Coase’s analysis showed, he said, was that “if one
assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to
bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the
market by bargains.”134 That is, in a Coase-theorem world, there will
be no inefficiencies whatsoever; ostensible market failures will always
be efficiently resolved via bargaining between affected parties,
whatever their number and the context of the problem.135
Having recanted his earlier charge against the Coase theorem, Calabresi proceeded to offer his most penetrating insight into the theorem
to date, one that could be considered either laudatory or damning,
depending on one’s perspective, and is worth quoting at length:
Far from being surprising, this statement is tautological, at least if
one accepts any of the various classic definitions of misallocation.
These ultimately come down to a statement akin to the following: A
misallocation exists when there is available a possible reallocation in
which all those who would lose from the reallocation could be fully
compensated by those who would gain, and, at the end of this compensation process, there would still be some who would be better
off than before.136

However, he continued:
This and other similar definitions of resource misallocation merely
mean that there is a misallocation when a situation can be improved
by bargains. If people are rational, bargains are costless, and there
are no legal impediments to bargains, transactions will ex hypothesis
occur to the point where bargains can no longer improve the situation; to the point, in short, of optimal resource allocation. We can,
therefore, state as an axiom the proposition that all externalities can
be internalized and all misallocations, even those created by legal
structures, can be remedied by the market, except to the extent that
transactions cost money or the structure itself creates some impediments to bargaining.137
132. Id. at 67–68. It should be noted that economists continued to debate for some
time whether there were other valid reasons why the entry/exit critique was legitimate. See, e.g., Medema & Zerbe, supra note 12, at 842–43 (discussing the entry/exit
critique).
133. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 129, at 68.
134. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
135. University of Chicago economist Harold Demsetz made a nearly identical
claim in the Quarterly Journal of Economics that same year. See Harold Demsetz,
The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 33 (1968).
136. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 129, at 68.
137. Id.
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Calabresi was the first, but by no means the last, to label the Coase
theorem a tautology.138
In Calabresi’s hands, though, the theorem was a useful tautology,
and he managed to find real-world utility and applicability in Coase’s
result, in spite of his own overall pessimism about the feasibility bargaining solutions. Indeed, Calabresi identified three areas in which he
believed that Coase’s negotiation result could inform legal thinking
and decision making—one of which was a positive insight and two of
which were normative in nature.139
The first of these went to one of the concerns that preoccupied Calabresi throughout his discussions of accident law: the prospect that
judges may misidentify the least-cost avoider and allocate costs to the
wrong activity.140 Calabresi believed that Coase’s negotiation analysis
provided a potential remedy in such situations: Coase-theorem-like
negotiations have the potential to correct errors in the assignment of
liability.141
But the possibilities of the market did not end there. Calabresi was
also of the mind that assignments of liability informed by Coase’s insight could aid this self-correcting process, and it is here that Calabresi
put a normative spin on the issue.142 If, as will often be the case, we
are uncertain about which party is the least-cost avoider, he said, the
operative question becomes: “Which mistaken allocation can be cured
most cheaply by parties entering into transactions with each other in
the market?”143 The rule that emerges from this line of thinking, for
Calabresi, is that, unless we are quite certain which of the parties is
the least-cost avoider, “we should put the burden on the party which
can cure a mistake most cheaply if one has been made, and thus help
the market to operate as effectively as possible.”144 And, as he noted
a year later in 1968, “This amounts to the following injunction: when
in doubt, allocate the cost to the party who can most cheaply enter
into transactions to rectify the error.”145 In setting forth this prescrip138. Id. Calabresi also referred to Coase’s result as the “welfare economics analogue of Say’s law.” Id. Say’s law is a proposition originating in the classical economics of the early 19th century that holds that “supply creates its own demand” and, as a
result, there can never be a general overproduction (and thus, some would say, recession) in the economy. It was not until the work of John Maynard Keynes a century
later that economists developed an effective theoretical counter to Say’s argument.
See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY 18 (1936).
139. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 129, at 72.
140. Id.
141. Calabresi, The Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, supra note 5, at 231–32
n.28.
142. Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims?, supra note 104, at 607.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 608.
145. Guido Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident
Costs?, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 447 (1968).
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tion, Calabresi was stating, for the first time, the idea that later became known as the “normative Coase theorem,” which holds that one
should structure the law to remove impediments to private
agreements.146
Third, and perhaps of the greatest long-run significance for the economic analysis of law, Calabresi argued that the Coase theorem could
serve as a guide to, and perhaps even justification for, real-world judicial decision making. As Calabresi pointed out in 1968, the effect of
Coase theorem-type bargains is to minimize the cost of accidents.
Thus, if this efficiency criterion is the goal for law, this implies that
“[t]he resource allocation aim is to approximate, both closely and
cheaply, the result the market would bring about if bargaining actually
were costless.”147 In making this claim, Calabresi brought the “mimic
the market” criterion into legal thinking well before Richard Posner
made it famous, and Calabresi used the Coase theorem to provide the
theoretical justification for this approach.148
The Coase theorem, then, was a useful weapon in Calabresi’s crusade to replace the fault system with a market-based system of deterrence. The theorem showed how the market could efficiently
accomplish such deterrence, and the real-world impediments to the
accomplishment of the results contemplated by the Coase theorem
provided a blueprint for factors that should be taken into account in
devising a system to allocate costs in a world of imperfect markets.149
“If we, as a society, are generally committed to a free market,” said
Calabresi, “we should try to retain, expand, and make more efficient
the market part of” the decision as to how to allocate the cost of accidents.150 The Coase theorem did precisely this by showing that an
ongoing market exchange relationship need not exist to accomplish
deterrence, but that something approaching the results that would
emerge from a deterrence relationship, were it feasible, could be implemented to accomplish cost-minimizing deterrence.151 By the end
of the 1960s, then, Calabresi was a committed believer in the theorem’s logic and utility, even if equally convinced of its limited direct
real-world applicability.
146. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 92 (6th ed. 2012).
147. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 129, at 69.
148. On the use of the Coase theorem to justify the efficiency basis for legal decision making, see Steven G. Medema, Legal Fiction: The Place of the Coase Theorem
in Law and Economics, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 209 (1999). It is noteworthy that Lawrence
Tribe labeled this the “Coase–Calabresi” position. See Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 90 (1972). One could argue that
attributing this idea to Coase is a bit of a stretch, but the attribution to Calabresi
suggests his centrality in this history, which later came to be more closely linked to
Posner and Chicago. See Kitch, supra note 2, at 227.
149. Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims?, supra note 104, at 610.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 607.
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IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Though the debate between Blum and Kalven and Calabresi and its
attendant references to Coase’s negotiation result extended into the
late 1960s, the spread of Coase’s result into areas of legal analysis beyond automobile accident law was already well underway—stimulated
in part by this debate, which, because of the prominence of the outlets
in which these articles appeared and the pertinence of the subject, had
the effect of exposing a larger community of scholars to Coase’s result. As we shall see, what particularly stands out in these discussions
is that legal scholars took Coase’s negotiation result seriously as an
insight that potentially could inform legal analysis and that could be
applied to a variety of legal questions. The most substantial set of
applications was made within the realm of products liability law—a
move that, as it happened, involved an interesting twist on Coase’s
analysis.
A.

Liability in Theory

Calabresi’s economic analysis of liability in the context of accident
law spilled over rather quickly to the discussion of products liability,
itself a topic of some controversy in the 1960s, and carried Coase’s
negotiation result along with it.152 Given that accident law was the
original entry point for the Coase theorem in the legal literature, it
perhaps is understandable that this result would make its way into
products liability analysis—particularly in light of the fact that Calabresi and Blum and Kalven had made reference to products-liabilityrelated issues in their respective analyses of accident law. These discussions were picked up on in the subsequent products-liability literature and, perhaps not surprisingly, this literature reflects some of the
same attitudes toward Coase’s result that we find in Calabresi and in
Blum and Kalven. What is particularly interesting, though, are the
various ways in which this result was applied to aspects of productsliability analysis.
At the heart of the discussions of products liability during this period was the tendency of the courts to hold manufacturers strictly liable for the harm caused by their products—that is, to hold them liable
regardless of whether they were demonstrably at fault for the harm or
whether the consumer had undertaken appropriate precautions in the
152. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966) [hereinafter Franklin, When Worlds Collide]; Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery:
Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967) [hereinafter
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery]; Friedrich Kessler, Products Liability, 76
YALE L.J. 887 (1967); Joseph N. Onek, The Montreal Agreement and Enterprise Liability, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 603 (1967); Paul C. Weiler, Defamation, Enterprise Liability, and Freedom of Speech, 17 U. TORONTO L.J. 278 (1967); W. Page Keeton,
Products Liability—Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398 (1969).
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use of the product. One artifact of strict liability was a willingness of
the courts to, in some instances, invalidate disclaimers that accompanied the sale of the product, wherein the consumer, by purchasing the
product, agreed to absolve the manufacturer of liability for harms
caused by product defects. Professor Marc Franklin of Stanford Law
School took up Coase’s negotiation result when discussing the disclaimer issue in, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Product Cases, which was published in the Stanford Law
Review in 1966.153 Franklin clerked for Chief Justice Earl Warren
from 1958–1959, the same period during which Calabresi was clerking
for Justice Hugo Black, and the two became good friends. One artifact of this relationship was that Franklin had followed the Calabresi–Blum and Kalven debate, and he recognized the relevance of
this work, including Coase’s negotiation result, to his own analysis.154
Franklin referenced the case of a New York woman who joined a
fitness club and was subsequently injured in a fall near the club’s
swimming pool. As the result of the fall, she filed suit against the
club.155 The club’s membership contract included a disclaimer that
absolved the club from liability for injuries caused by the negligence
of its employees, and the court found in the club’s favor, arguing that
there were no grounds for invalidating the contract whose terms had
been freely agreed upon by the two parties.156 Though the court upheld the disclaimer, Franklin pointed out that there was precedent in
New York case law for disclaimer invalidation, one of the rationales
for which was that the presence of a valid disclaimer would lead to
increased carelessness on the part of businesses. Franklin’s assessment was that this carelessness justification had, as he put it, “theoretical difficulties,” and he grounded his position in Coase’s negotiation
result.157 If courts do not uphold disclaimers, said Franklin, the businesses will adjust their prices upward to account for the increase in
expected liability costs.158 If the disclaimers are upheld, in contrast,
consumers will see the costs of insurance increase.159 But this, in turn,
will lead consumers to demand that businesses lower their prices in
order to help the consumers offset some of these increased costs.160
153. Franklin, When Worlds Collide, supra note 152, at 1005. Franklin received his
legal education at Cornell. Marc A. Franklin, Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law,
Emeritus. Biography, STANFORD LAW SCH., https://www.law.stanford.edu/profile/
marc-a-franklin (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
154. Letter from Guido Calabresi to Steven Medema (Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with
author); Letter from Marc Franklin to Steven Medema (July 20, 2012) (on file with
author).
155. Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 177 N.E.2d 925 (1961). See also Franklin,
When Worlds Collide, supra note 152, at 1004.
156. Ciofalo, 177 N.E.2d at 926.
157. Franklin, When Worlds Collide, supra note 152, at 1005.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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The effect is that the net prices/costs faced by businesses and consumers will not vary across the two different disclaimer regimes.161 As
such, said Franklin (citing Coase), the fear of increased carelessness is
unjustified: the existence of valid disclaimers “should have the same
incentive toward safety that the basic law of negligence would have in
the absence of disclaimers.”162
The alert reader may have noticed that Franklin’s analysis bears a
striking similarity to Blum and Kalven’s discussion of the watch-dial
case and Calabresi’s workers’ compensation illustration, where the
parties are involved in what Calabresi referred to as a (pre-existing)
“bargaining relationship”—situations where, for more than a half-century, it was asserted that the assignment of liability would have no
allocative impact.163 It would seem, then, that Franklin was on solid
theoretical ground in his assertions regarding invariance. Yet, Franklin was ascribing this result to Coase, whose analysis in The Problem
of Social Cost had dealt neither with market-wide phenomena nor
with parties who are in an existing bargaining relationship, but rather
with situations of bilateral negotiations among independent agents.164
It would appear, then, that things are beginning to get a bit murky.
Complicating the matter still further is the fact that Franklin was far
from the only scholar during this period to expand the Coase theorem’s domain and ostensible originality in this way. This propensity to
assimilate market-wide phenomena into Coase’s negotiation result
continued in Paul Weiler’s evaluation of the application of strict liability to defamation cases, which was published in the University of Toronto Law Journal the following year.165 This subject led Weiler, of
the University of Toronto’s Osgoode Law School, to explore the
larger treatments of liability in tort law, including the Calabresi–Blum
and Kalven debates over the allocation of the cost of accidents, in the
process of which he brought Coase into his discussion.166
Weiler considered Coase’s analysis an attack on the concept of enterprise liability and on the claim that enterprise liability was necessary to achieve a “rational”—that is, efficient—allocation of
resources.167 Coase’s argument, he said, informs us that, “[s]tarting
from a situation in which the loss arises out of a bargaining relationship between plaintiff and defendant, it can be shown that the ultimate
incidence of the loss will be determined by the structure of the mar161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 5, at 730.
164. See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1.
165. Weiler, supra note 152. Weiler received his LL.B. from the University of Toronto’s Osgoode Hall Law School in 1964 and his LL.M. from Harvard Law School in
1965. Paul C. Weiler, Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Emeritus, HARVARD LAW
SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10940/Weiler (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
166. Weiler, supra note 152.
167. Id. at 297.
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ket, no matter where it is originally attributed by the law.”168 Moreover, Weiler went on to note that, assuming “the conditions for a
rational market” are satisfied, the resulting allocation of resources will
be that which is most efficient, with all cost-effective safety measures
being adopted.169 In light of this, he concluded that, “given our original assumption about tort law (in the absence of fault)”—that the goal
is to minimize accident losses through a combination of compensation
and deterrence170—“the law should not waste its resources by shifting
the loss from where it originally fell.”171 In short, contradicting those
who argued that a rational or efficient allocation of resources requires
that the costs be placed on the agents who generate the costs, Coase’s
logic, at least in Weiler’s hands, showed that there is simply no efficiency-based rationale for a move to enterprise liability. And once
again, Coase’s bilateral bargaining analysis was interpreted as applying to, and providing the theoretical basis for understanding, marketwide phenomena involving losses or harms that occur within existing
bargaining relationships—with no apparent recognition of the fact
that this was a long-established result in economic theory.
One of the several oddities of Coase theorem-related legal scholarship during the 1960s, at least when viewed against the backdrop of
the traditional stories of “law and economics” as a Chicago-driven
movement, is that the theorem was invoked in scholarship emanating
from Yale more often than it was in that from Chicago (about which
more below). But curiously, Calabresi’s careful attempt to distinguish
between the existing bargaining relationship and the situations contemplated by Coase was disappearing, even at Yale. Calabresi’s Yale
colleague, the Legal Realist, Friedrich Kessler, like Franklin, invoked
Coase’s negotiation result in the context of disclaimers—in this case,
in the evaluation of whether disclaimers should be permitted if they
are paid for via a two-tiered pricing structure.172 Under such a system,
the product in question could be sold without a disclaimer at one price
and with a disclaimer at another, lower price.173 This system, Kessler
pointed out, was implicit in existing practices of charging different
prices for warranties of different lengths and for products, such as automobiles, with different optional safety features.174 Should the same
pricing practice, he asked, be allowed in the presence or absence of a
disclaimer?175 In theory at least, Coase’s analysis suggests that it
should, and the economic logic here is virtually identical to that in
Franklin’s discussion. The higher product price that accompanied the
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 297–98 (emphasis added).
Id. at 298.
Id.
Id.
Kessler, supra note 152, at 925.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id.
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absence of a disclaimer effectively amounts to the consumer’s
purchase of insurance against product defects, and the theory would
predict the emergence of a set of market prices that precisely accounts
for the allocation risk in the presence or absence of the disclaimer—
with no differential effects on prices, output levels, or accidents. Once
again, then, Coase’s analysis was put forward as a justification for the
idea that existing markets could effectively and invariantly internalize
costs.
This theme was continued in Joseph Onek’s analysis of liability for
aviation accidents.176 Onek, a former student of Calabresi at Yale177
then occupying a federal court of appeals clerkship, argued that, while
deterrence requires putting accident costs on those participating in the
relevant activity, it does not tell us on which party the costs should be
placed in order to achieve the appropriate level of deterrence. Onek’s
first stab at answering the liability question involved an appeal to
Coase, the single cited source for his claim that “economists have
pointed out that, in theory, it does not matter whether the costs of
aviation accidents are initially borne by the airlines or the passengers.”178 The absorption of the existing bargaining relationship context into Coase’s negotiation result is evident in Onek’s assertion that
this result derives from the fact that “airlines and passengers stand in
a bargaining relationship to each other” through the purchase and sale
of tickets.179 His explanation of the logic of invariance here parallels
that in Franklin’s discussion of the gymnasium disclaimer case: “If the
accident costs are placed on the airline,” he said, “it will charge more
for flights in order to purchase liability insurance or self-insure.”180
“If costs are placed on the passengers, they will wish to take out insurance and, in theory, at least, will demand that airline prices be lowered
accordingly.”181 The result, he said, is that “[e]ither way the same
market pressure for greater safety will ultimately reach the airline.”182
The Yale connection continued in 1967 with a student note, authored by Henry L. Woodward, on Borrowed Servants and the Theory
of Enterprise Liability, which was published in the Yale Law Journal.183 Here, Woodward invoked Coase’s negotiation result in the
context of an analysis of whether negligent employees, rather than
176. Onek, supra note 152, at 605.
177. Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives, Living Graduates and
Non-Graduates of Yale University Sixty-fourth Series Number 11 at 878 (June 1,
1968) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Yale University Library System).
178. Onek, supra note 152, at 605.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Note, Borrowed Servants and the Theory of Enterprise Liability, 76 YALE L.J.
807 (1967). Although an unsigned note, Calabresi confirmed the author as Henry L.
Woodward. E-mail from Guido Calabresi to Steven Medema (Aug. 31, 2012) (on file
with author).
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employers, should be held liable for damage caused by accidents associated with the use of a company’s product.184 Woodward noted that
strict manufacturer liability, which was often recommended because
the employer can better spread the costs of accidents (over consumers
generally, through higher prices) and that manufacturer liability will
better promote general deterrence, was being challenged.185 Specifically, “[c]ommentators have argued that, from the standpoint of resource allocation, accident costs could as well be placed on employees
as on their employers.”186 The logic here, of course, is identical to the
workers’ compensation situation that economists had examined,
reaching the same conclusion, in the early 1900s. Woodward applied
the same line of reasoning to relationships between independent contractors, such as a crane company and a building contractor, noting
that “the initial allocation of loss” for crane accidents “is immaterial”
because prices will adjust to allocate costs identically regardless of
whether the crane company or the building contractor is made liable
at law.187
While Woodward’s initial supporting reference for the allocative invariance idea was Calabresi’s The Decision for Accidents, Woodward
pointed out that “[t]he idea that actual or potential bargaining parties
will always reach the same final allocation of costs regardless of the
initial placement of liability has been given its most cogent theoretical
elaboration” by Coase in The Problem of Social Cost.188 Woodward
too, then, was explicitly linking Coase to the analysis of parties in an
existing bargaining relationship, and this in spite of Calabresi’s careful
differentiation between these two insights in his 1965 article.189 But
again, the context and logic was not that of Coase’s bilateral bargaining framework; instead, it was the much older one of market prices
adjusting in response to different assignments of liability.
Three themes emerge from these several discussions of products liability law. First, and most obviously, Coase’s negotiation result was
slowly being grafted into the analysis of products liability. Second,
and quite interestingly, though some mention was made of efficiency,
it was not the primary focus of these discussions of Coase’s result;
rather, the focus was largely on invariance—the idea that the allocation of costs, the deterrent effect, etc. would not be impacted by the
location of liability placement. This represents both an interesting
take on Coase, and a significant departure from Calabresi and from
the economists discussing Coase’s result during the 1960s, the latter of
whom, like Calabresi, were much more focused on the idea that costs
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Woodward, supra note 183, at 815.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 815 n.33 (emphasis added).
Id. at 815.
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would be allocated efficiently through the negotiation process than on
the idea that allocation would be invariant across alternative assignments of liability.190 Third, the distinction made by Calabresi and by
Blum and Kalven between the presence and absence of a (pre-existing) bargaining relationship had all but disappeared, and Coase was
seen as having provided the theoretical argument that underlies the
former as well as the latter.
Why does this last distinction matter? Part of this goes to the nature and originality of Coase’s result. As we have already noted, and
as Calabresi emphasized, Coase did not discuss the existing relationships and the market-wide phenomena associated with consumer
products, workers’ compensation, and the like. Yet, his authority as
an economist was being invoked to support invariance claims in these
situations, and his negotiation result was viewed as having demonstrated as much, when in fact it had not. Furthermore, and as we have
already noted, the invariant effects of alternative assignments of liability in a market context was well-established decades before Coase
penned The Problem of Social Cost, meaning that even if one wished
to ascribe this result to Coase, it was not original with him. What was
effectively playing out here, then, was an expansion of both the range
and domain of Coase’s negotiation result at the hands of legal scholars.
There is more to all of this, though, than questions of priority, correct attribution, and what Coase had or had not said and demonstrated; there is also an important theoretical issue in play. The
“existing relationships” result reflects the basic economic intuition
that markets can be expected to do a reasonable job of translating
costs into prices. But markets tend to function more smoothly than do
individual bargaining situations because “individuals” do not matter—
the agents have an established forum for cost- and price-related interactions, and in reasonably competitive situations, no one actor has any
significant control over price. In such situations, economic theory had
for some two centuries suggested that market prices will adjust to take
account of cost- and benefit-related phenomena, whether these take
the form of different assignments of liability for workers’ compensation, different product or occupational attributes (including risk), or
advantages or disadvantages of location. The situations contemplated
by Coase embodied none of the market-related characteristics that
generate the smooth price adjustments of this traditional theory. They
simply involved parties with no regularized form of market interaction
whose respective activities put them into conflict with each other. The
framework and logic through which their disputes are resolved, via the
negotiation mechanisms contemplated by Coase, are completely different from those for parties in an existing market relationship. But
regardless of one’s perspective on these theoretical niceties, the fact
190. See Medema, Rethinking Market Failure, supra note 4, at 59.
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remains that the nature of Coase’s negotiation result was being reshaped—one of many illustrations that the “Coase theorem” was
something that evolved and was worked out in the literature of this
and succeeding periods by the various communities of scholars who
brought it into their discourse.
B.

Liability in Practice

Each of the authors discussed above believed that Coase’s negotiation result provided the underpinnings for an assertion that, in theory,
the direction of products liability would not influence behavior or outcomes in this realm. When it came to actual implementation and thus
the practical utility of Coase’s insight, however, a very different view
emerged. The issue, as each of these authors emphasized, is that
Coase’s negotiation analysis turns out to be unrealistic for several
reasons.
Franklin offered three criticisms of the negotiation result, each of
which went to problems that would manifest themselves if consumers
were made liable and thus not only went against the invariance claim
but spoke in favor of enterprise liability.191 First, he said, consumers
often are not in as good a position to assess the risk of injury as are
the business owners, and the consumer is unlikely to be able to properly self-insure against injury.192 Second, insurance purchased by consumers against injuries caused by defective products is unlikely to
cover non-monetary (e.g., pain and suffering) losses.193 Third, consumers are unlikely to have sufficient bargaining power to induce the
businesses to reduce their prices to account for the risk being borne by
the consumers.194
To this Kessler added two more factors that he believed would
make the Coasean solution problematic: first, the number of parties
potentially involved, and second, the fact that a seller cannot predict
who may be harmed by a defective product.195 In the latter case,
though the buyer may have willingly assumed the relevant risks, someone other than the person to whom the seller originally sold the product may be harmed. For example, a passenger in an automobile or a
pedestrian may be harmed as the result of an automobile defect manifesting itself, but these individuals were not party to the transaction
over the automobile.196 These factors, said Kessler, tell us that “[t]he
sale of dangerous products does not fall into the bargaining pattern
envisioned in Mr. Coase’s analysis.”197 Both Weiler and Woodward
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Franklin, When Worlds Collide, supra note 152, at 1005.
Id.
Id. at 1005–06.
Id. at 1006.
Kessler, supra note 152, at 933.
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echoed these same cautionary themes, but Weiler went a step further,
arguing that, as Calabresi had emphasized, in the absence of a preexisting bargaining relationship, there is the further problem that the
“cost[s] of achieving a viable market” may greatly exceed the associated benefits.198
The thrust of these arguments, then, was that the presence of what
we now call “transaction costs” would preclude the operation of the
Coasean negotiation process in the real world. This pessimism about
the ability of the Coasean outcome to manifest itself in products liability cases—particularly as relates to the consumer side of the relationship—led these authors to support the imposition of liability on
sellers, on grounds ranging from deterrence to cost effectiveness.199
Franklin nicely captured the overall tenor of this discussion—that
Coase’s result is a nice argument in theory but lacks significant realworld applicability—when he summarized his own analysis of disclaimers with the assertion, “if the parties are really in a position to
bargain over the cost consequences of any increased negligence, there
is no reason to fear that there will be increased carelessness as the
results of disclaimers,” but if such bargaining is not possible, as will
often be the case in reality, “a seller who has superior bargaining
power over all contract prices and terms” will have “the buyer at his
mercy,” leading to an unfair outcome in the absence of regulation.200
In short, the unanimous view was that there are significant hazards
associated with legal rulemaking based upon a presumption in favor
of Coase’s result.
While Franklin et al. appear to have been willing to accept the implications of Coase’s negotiation result for legal decision making were
the relevant bargaining processes feasible, not everyone was on board
198. Weiler, supra note 152, at 298 n.103 (citing Calabresi, The Wonderful World of
Blum and Kalven, supra note 5, at 224–33). Franklin also cited Coase to the effect
that it may be costly to establish an equal bargaining position. See Franklin, When
Worlds Collide, supra note 152, at 1006 n.189; Coase, supra note 1, at 15–19. Milton
Katz made a similar argument in an article on tort liability and technology
assessment:
At this point, however, I want only to remark again that the incidence of a
cost is determined by the legal order. Damage to the community caused by
waste products from our hypothetical electric power plant will be a ‘social’
and ‘external’ cost only if and to the extent that the legal system may so
decree. The legal system may alter or maintain the incidence of a cost by
recognizing, or declining to recognize, a cause of action in tort against the
company. It may enable the persons involved to adjust or modify the incidence of a cost, or frustrate their efforts to do so, by giving effect, or refusing
to give effect, to agreements among them.
Milton Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L.
REV. 587, 593 (1969).
199. See, e.g., Franklin, When Worlds Collide, supra note 152, at 1007–12; Onek,
supra note 152, at 605; Woodward, supra note 183, at 815; Franklin, Replacing the
Negligence Lottery, supra note 152, at 783–84.
200. Franklin, When Worlds Collide, supra note 152, at 1006.
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with this viewpoint. University of Texas Law School Dean W. Page
Keeton, for one, pointed to the unusual nature of the argument made
by “[s]ome economists” that, on efficiency grounds, it may be best to
assign liability for injuries caused by defective products to someone
other than the manufacturers of those products and the attendant notion—more important for present purposes—that, even if courts are
inclined to hold manufacturers liable, the manufacturers and consumers should be allowed to engage in voluntary bargains that would absolve the former of liability.201 The message associated with this
position, Keeton said, was that courts should honor disclaimers—a
message that he opposed. Equally concerning to Keeton was the
more philosophical point that the rationale provided for this position,
which he attributed to Coase and to Calabresi in his 1968 defense of
the Coase theorem,202 was nothing more than efficiency—that “voluntary exchange will result in both less expensive products and the allocation of ultimate responsibility for avoiding accidents to the one who
has the comparative advantage economically to avoid the cost of the
accidents.”203
Keeton found the implications of the economists’ stance sufficiently
at odds with received legal thinking that he felt compelled to italicize
his entire explication of them:
This would mean that a consumer and others who are injured
through the use of a product do not have any right to be secure from
harm from dangerous products apart from a right to be informed or
apart from safety legislation. Moreover, safety legislation that would
require the elimination of an open and obvious type of danger and
that interferes with voluntary market arrangements would necessarily
be suspect.204

Keeton, was not concerned with the particulars of whether Coase’s
result was likely to be applicable to the real world. Rather, like Blum
and Kalven, he simply could not countenance setting aside what he
saw as the established legal framework in favor of the economic approach and the evaluation of outcomes grounded in the primacy of the
market.205 Even if one granted the economists’ position on efficiency,
he said, “fairness in the allocation of the cost of accidents when they
do occur should be the primary concern of the law.”206 Where economists were concerned with the minimization of costs, Keeton emphasized that “[e]very effort should be made to minimize” not the cost of
accidents, but the impact of accident costs on “wealth distribution.”207
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Keeton, supra note 152, at 401.
See id.
Id. at 401.
Id.
Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 401.
Id.
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In short, he considered the theory of efficient deterrence to be “of
dubious significance” compared to questions of fairness and justice in
these cases.208 For Keeton, then, the Coase theorem, and the economic approach to law generally, missed the mark not because of any
lack of realism, but because of a conflict with what he believed to be
the ethical foundations of the law.209
It is fair to say that Coase’s negotiation result played little more
than a bit part in the larger discussion of tort law in the 1960s, though
The Problem of Social Cost was referenced in roughly 25% of the articles citing Calabresi’s influential work on the subject during this period. The citation patterns in the literature discussed in this Section
suggest that it was through Calabresi, Blum, and Kalven that Coase’s
insight made its way into the products liability literature, as opposed
to Coase’s analysis having been brought into the discussion because
these scholars had read Coase and felt that his negotiation result merited some attention in their analysis. The treatments accorded to the
Coase theorem parallel both the discussion that we witness in the Calabresi–Blum and Kalven debate and the treatments by economists
who discussed Coase’s result in the context of externality analysis, in
that Coase’s result, when it was mentioned, was accepted as a theoretically valid proposition, but the extent of its applicability was thought
to be very limited.
V. BEYOND

THE

LAW

OF

TORTS

While torts was the area of law in which Coase’s negotiation result
was most often discussed during the 1960s, scholars working in other
areas were also drawing on this idea. Of the various legal treatments
of Coase’s negotiation result during this period, that by his University
of Chicago Law School colleague Allison Dunham in his article,
Promises Respecting the Use of Land,210 was undoubtedly the closest
in form and spirit to Coase’s own discussion. The legal context of
Dunham’s article, which was published in the Journal of Law and Economics—by then under Coase’s editorship—in 1965, was land-use
conflicts of the type contemplated by Coase, and though Dunham
made direct reference to Coase—and also to George Stigler’s 1966
elaboration of a “Coase theorem”—only in an early footnote to literature treating externality-related nuisance, the analysis, examples, and
208. Id.
209. See id. at 402. (Keeton’s objections, of course, went to the heart of the criticisms that were to be leveled against the economic analysis of law in the 1970s and
1980s). See, e.g., Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, HOFSTRA L. REV.
(1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, HOFSTRA L. REV. (1980). That said,
Keeton was not willing to declare that economics had nothing to offer to law. See
Keeton, supra note 152, at 402.
210. Allison Dunham, Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 8 J.L. & ECON. 133
(1965) [hereinafter Dunham, Promises].
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even the language of Dunham’s article show the unmistakable influence of The Problem of Social Cost on his thinking.211
But Dunham did not come to this position naturally. He had arrived at Chicago along with Karl Llewellyn in the early 1950s and, like
Llewellyn, was less than enamored of the economics in the air at the
law school.212 It was not long, however, before Dunham’s attitude began to change, and Henry Manne has related the story of Dunham’s
conversion experience:
There was the tea every afternoon down in the student lounge, and
we noticed that early on in that year—this was fifty-one or fiftytwo—that [sic] someone of Walter Blum, Harry Kalven, [Bernard]
Meltzer, sometimes [Edward] Levi, often Aaron [Director], would
talk with Allison Dunham in that room. Early in the fall, as he began to hear what was being said about economics and economics
and law at Chicago, he just was completely incredulous. He just
could not believe it. He had a kind of sneering response to this that
it couldn’t really be. The process continued. Every afternoon one
could watch it as Dunham began to weaken, or smarten, I should
say. By midyear he was listening attentively. He was no longer being hostile and opposing, and by the end of the year it was just one
happy party as they were all investigating issues of interest all together. It was a quite remarkable thing to watch. In that one year
someone who came from—literally—total ignorance even of the existence of the possibility of that kind of analysis to a rather confirmed and I would almost say sophisticated student of that time of
law and economics.213

By the late 1950s, Dunham’s scholarship was showing the impact that
economics had on his thinking.214
Though writing only a year after Blum and Kalven had referred to
Coase’s analysis as an instance of “recent economic theorizing,”215
Dunham characterized Coase’s negotiation result as “conventional economic theory”—an interesting claim given that the economics profession as a whole was by no means on board with Coase’s analysis at
this point. The negotiation result, if “conventional theory,” was only
so at the Universities of Chicago and Virginia—and perhaps
UCLA.216 Dunham also considered the negotiation result to be some211. See id.; Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1.
212. See Kitch, supra note 2, at 186–87.
213. Id. at 187.
214. See, e.g., Allison Dunham, City Planning: An Analysis of the Content of the
Master Plan, 1 J.L. & ECON. 170 (1958).
215. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, supra
note 5, at 699. See also discussion supra p. 170–71.
216. Dunham, supra note 210, at 135. Dunham’s “conventional” label resonates
with the characterization of the theorem given by University of Chicago economist
George Stigler in his 1966 price theory textbook. See STIGLER, supra note 3, at
110–14. See also Medema, supra note 4 (describing the treatment of Coase’s result by
economists in the early 1960s).
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thing more than a theoretical curiosity, pointing to Lewis v. Gollner217
as an example of a case in which “bargaining was used to rearrange
the uses which affect each other.”218 The particulars of this case are as
follows.
Gollner purchased a parcel of land in a nice residential neighborhood with the goal of constructing tenement houses and flats.219 The
residents of the neighborhood objected to this, and a deal was struck
wherein Gollner agreed to sell the parcel for a net profit of $6,000 and
a promise that he would not construct any such flats in the neighborhood.220 Negotiated solutions such as this one, said Dunham—and he
cited several others from case law—have the effect of “maximiz[ing]
satisfactions by arranging the uses so that the least diseconomies
would result.”221 This situation, then, illustrated for Dunham that
Coase’s negotiation result was a valid and realistic proposition.222
And if that were the end of the story, all would be well. But, as it
happens, it was not. Immediately after concluding negotiations with
Lewis, Gollner purchased a lot across the street from that which he
originally owned and began to erect a seven-story flat.223 Lewis then
announced his intention to file suit, at which point Gollner transferred
the ownership of the property to the name of his wife, presumably
with the idea that this would insulate him from liability for breach of
promise.224
What we have here, then, is a case where a welfare-improving bargain was made, in the spirit of Coase, but one party later tried to get
around the result of the bargain.225 This, for Dunham, raised the
problem of how to ensure the keeping of promises with respect to the
use of land—the larger subject of his article. While Coase’s negotiation analysis was useful on its own terms, Lewis v. Gollner, Dunham
said, was illustrative of the need for legal instruments to police and
enforce the bargains once made so that the efficiency-enhancing outcomes contemplated by Coase’s analysis are actually achieved.226 For
Coase’s negotiation solution to work its efficiency-enhancing magic in
situations such as that found in Lewis v. Gollner, there must be legal
mechanisms in place to ensure that promises respecting land use are,
217. Lewis v. Gollner, 29 N.E. 81 (N.Y. 1892).
218. Dunham, Promises, supra note 210, at 135.
219. Lewis, 29 N.E. at 81.
220. Id.
221. Dunham, Promises, supra note 210, at 137–38.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 137.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 135–37.
226. The issues raised by Dunham here are not dissimilar to those pointed to by his
University of Chicago colleague, Harold Demsetz of the Graduate School of Business, in a 1964 article published in the Journal of Law and Economics. See Demsetz,
supra note 135. If Dunham was aware of Demsetz’s work, it is not indicated in his
article.
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in fact, adhered to, and Dunham spent the remainder of the article
fleshing out how law might facilitate this in an exposition that provided the basis for literature worked out in the 1970s suggesting that
private bargaining and the law of covenants provided an efficient market alternative to zoning.227
Dunham, then, was clearly of the mind that efficiency-enhancing
bargains à la Coase had significant potential for realization if the law
created the appropriate context for such bargains. Indeed, he was far
more optimistic about this prospect than were many other legal commentators during this period. One of the more intriguing aspects of
Dunham’s discussion is the fact that he did not cite Coase, or anyone
else, directly in making his arguments about the negotiation result—
chalking it up instead to “conventional economic thinking,” as we
noted earlier. This may speak to the general acceptance of this stream
of thought at Chicago, at least among those disposed to be sympathetic to the application of economic thinking to the law. It is also
worth noting, by way of contrast with the products-liability literature,
that Dunham made no mention of Coase’s invariance claim, electing
instead to devote his focus to the question of efficiency.
Coase’s negotiation result was also brought in by lawyers in discussions of a wide range of regulatory issues, and several of them, like
Dunham, saw promise in the alternative that Coase’s analysis offered
to traditional political-regulatory solutions. The earliest example of
this line of scholarship was Yale Law School professor Ward Bowman’s treatment of the social costs and benefits related to continued
passenger (commuter) service on the New Haven Railroad, published
in the Journal of Law and Economics in 1966.228 Bowman, who had
been recruited to Yale from the University of Chicago and was a significant force in the development of the economics-infused Chicago
approach to antitrust, was concerned with the question of whether the
benefits of this railroad to the larger community justified the associated cost.
In an illuminating commentary that showed how economic theory
could be utilized to find an essential unity in the analysis of very disparate phenomena—a feature that was to emerge front-and-center as
the economic analysis of law continued to develop—Bowman argued
that the analysis of the New Haven Railroad is no different from other
227. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973). The Author is
grateful to Herbert Hovenkamp for bringing this point to my attention.
228. Ward Bowman, The New Haven, a Passenger Railroad for Nonriders, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 49 (1966). One could reasonably dispute whether Bowman belongs in the present analysis, given that he was an economist, rather than a lawyer, by training. We
have chosen to include him here because he spent virtually his entire academic career
as a member of law school faculties—first at Chicago and then at Yale. See The Modern Era, 1955-Present, YALE LAW SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/cbl/modernera.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
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situations that involve benefits or costs that spill over onto the larger
community, such as “a lighthouse, a smoking factory, or a hotel.”229
When it came to mechanisms for addressing these questions, Bowman
opened by noting that:
A most useful analysis of this kind of problem has been presented in
a previous issue of this Journal. Professor Coase showed that the
resolution of the problem of social cost by private negotiation has
much to recommend it over public coercion—such as banning a nuisance or, one might assume, subsidizing a benefit. The appropriateness of private negotiation is suggested because it leads to the
“right” amounts of output. This result (appropriate resource allocation) is most likely when the beneficiaries or sufferers from the private conduct are few and identifiable and where the cost of carrying
out the necessary negotiating process is not excessive.230

Though Coase’s analysis in The Problem of Social Cost assessed situations involving harm rather than benefit, Bowman emphasized that
the analysis is equally useful for assessing the latter, and he provided a
full exposition of the underlying logic—which, in summary form, argues that if people are willing to pay the cost associated with achieving
the desired benefits, then the project that provides these benefits is
both efficient and will be realized. This process, which Bowman
called “a dollar bidding market solution” to the social benefits problem, allows for the identification of benefits through the marketplace
and thus “calls for no political interference for a resolution of the
problem of social benefit.”231
Like our torts commentators, Bowman was well aware of the practical problems involved in applying Coase’s analysis to the railroad
question. In particular, the large numbers of parties involved and the
dispersion of benefits raised potential problems for market solution.
That said, Bowman was not optimistic about a political solution either,
as he did not consider the voting system a good proxy for benefit
quantification. But unlike the torts theorists, when it came to the
choice between these imperfect alternatives, Bowman came down on
the side of the market. “There is substantial reason,” he said, “for
expecting that the market is likely to reach a better conclusion than is
a vote for the railroad, a textile mill or a drug store,” particularly
when one realizes that the voting process itself is not costless. That is,
“private benefit,” for Bowman, “is a better proxy for social benefit
than is a majority vote.”232 The Coase theorem, in Bowman’s hands,
thus pointed the way toward an expanded use of market, rather than
regulatory, solutions for dealing with spillover problems.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Bowman, supra note 228, at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 58.
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Here, too, Coase’s result was finding its way into the writings of
law-school students. Sentiments very similar to Bowman’s can be
found in a discussion of landlord-tenant relationships undertaken by
E.A. Christensen, a second-year law student at Chicago, who cited
Coase’s negotiation result as the basis for a solution to the problem of
housing quality for low-income tenants.233 For Christensen, Coase’s
analysis suggested that in instances where landlords in slum-housing
developments fail to properly maintain their buildings, landlords and
tenants may be able to “obtain a satisfactory solution through bargaining,” and that such a solution would provide an alternative, and
perhaps a superior one, to existing proposals for leveling charges on
landlords for failing to maintain their buildings at an acceptable standard.234 Stanford Law School student Ozro Childs, meanwhile, argued that Coase’s negotiation result had relevance for larger-scale
legal-regulatory issues as well—such as the question of whether
CATV companies could charge the broadcasters for transmitting their
programs to a wider audience or whether the broadcasters would be
allowed to charge the CATV companies for rebroadcasting their programming.235 Childs argued that this decision as to who would be allowed to charge whom would have “no salutary effect on local
broadcasting.” Its only effect, he said, would be on the distribution of
wealth between the affected parties—the CATV and broadcast companies.236 Citing Coase in support of this claim, Childs noted that “[i]t
is a well-accepted proposition that, unless bargaining is prohibited or
made quite expensive, the allocation of resources in a competitive
economy is not determined by the initial definitions of rights.”237 For
Childs, the broadcasting industry clearly satisfied these conditions.238
233. See E.A. Christensen, The Public Housing Leasing Program: A Workable Rent
Subsidy, 1968 URB. L. ANN. 57 (1968).
234. Id. at 58 n.7 (arguing that the duties levied on landlords under the charges
system may serve only to increase rents without providing for improvement of the
premises and therefore do more harm than good since the fines reduce the amount of
money available for improvements to the property, and that the bargaining solution,
in contrast, would lead to negotiated improvements in living conditions in return for
the higher rents paid by the tenants).
235. See Ozro W. Childs, IV, The FCC’s Proposed CATV Regulations, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1685 (1969).
236. Id. at 1710.
237. Id. at 1710 n.87 (emphasis added).
238. Id. It is worth emphasizing that Childs believed that Coase’s result would obtain so long as bargaining is not “quite expensive,” suggesting broad latitude for
Coasean bargains generally and the invariance proposition in particular, and also that
he considered Coase’s result “well accepted”—though he did not provide any evidence (citations or otherwise) to support the latter claim. University of North Carolina economist Douglas Webbink presented a similar argument in an article published
in Law and Contemporary Problems at this same time. See Douglas W. Webbink, The
Impact of UHF Promotion: The All-Channel Television Receiver Law, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 535 (1969). Webbink, who received his Ph.D. in economics from Duke,
also invoked Coase, and noted that regardless of the direction payments are required
to flow, both CATV companies and broadcast stations would benefit and consumers
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But not all of those sympathetic to the Coase theorem or to the
economic approach to law generally, even at Chicago, were enthusiastic about the possibilities of Coase-type market solutions as compared
with regulatory ones. A case in point is Edmund Kitch, who had received his J.D. from Chicago in 1964 and was a member of the faculty
there.239 Kitch published an article in the Journal of Law and Economics in 1968 that examined the regulation of the natural-gas industry and, along the way, took note of the problems caused when
natural-gas wells connected to pipelines drained gas from neighboring
wells during the extraction process.240 The owners of the neighboring
wells were faced with a choice between having their gas drained away,
and thus losing the associated revenue, and extracting and selling their
gas immediately.241 The incentive, of course, was to go the latter
route, which resulted in an inefficient over-production of natural
gas.242 On the face of it, this might seem like a fruitful context for
Coase’s negotiation scheme to work its magic, given the commonalities with some of Coase’s illustrations. But Kitch did not see things
that way, and instead argued that “[t]his problem could only be solved
by regulation which controlled production.”243 Why? It was not that
Kitch was unaware of the potential applicability of Coase’s insight
here—indeed, far from it. Citing Coase, Kitch pointed out that “[t]he
problem could also have been solved by negotiations among all producers in the field.”244 But, he said, “fields were large, producers numerous, and the common interest of all the producers poorly
understood.”245 In short, practical considerations—transaction
costs—precluded negotiated solutions and, for Kitch, necessitated
government regulation.
It would appear that, Kitch’s arguments notwithstanding, those discussing Coase’s negotiation result outside of the torts context, taken
as a group, expressed a more optimistic view of the possibilities of
Coasean bargaining than did the torts theorists. The fact that such a
large share of the articles mentioning Coase’s result in the context of
market regulation emanated from Chicago may explain some of this
optimism, given the tendency of those working on regulatory issues at
Chicago, both inside and outside of the walls of the law school, to see
the imperfections associated with regulatory activity as more severe
will be largely unaffected—other than that viewers would have more program choices
with the advent of CATV. See id. at 535, 555 (1969).
239. Edmund W. Kitch, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.virginia.edu/
lawweb/faculty.nsf/FHPbI/1180712 (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
240. Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, 11 J.L. & ECON. 243 (1968).
241. Id. at 253.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 253 n.39.
245. Id.
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than those associated with the market. The fact that the Chicago contributions, save for the work by Blum and Kalven, were predominately in the area of regulation may appear a bit unusual, given the
breadth that we today identify with the “Chicago” law and economics.
But we must bear in mind that law and economics at Chicago during
this period was still very much focused on the antitrust and regulatory
issues that reflected the interests of Aaron Director, whose efforts
shaped the first generation of law and economics at Chicago, and
those who surrounded him. The idea of applying economics, and the
Coase theorem in particular, to the far corners of the law had not yet
caught on, even at Chicago.
VI. THE COASE THEOREM

AS A

TOOL

FOR

LEGAL EXPLANATION

The uses of Coase’s negotiation result probed thus far were focused
on how this result could inform an assessment of the impacts of alternative legal rules or on how the market-like solutions that this result
suggests may offer a superior alternative to traditional regulatory
schemes. Perhaps the most unique application of Coase’s result during the 1960s, however, comes not from considering its prescriptive
power, but from its use to justify or explain the existence or utility of
particular legal phenomena. The first instance of this sort of application of Coase’s result came from Dunham, who in Promises Respecting the Use of Land, considered possible rationales for the historical
failure of judges to provide more than a very limited scope to the law
of nuisance, in spite of the fairly wide range of situations in which the
actions of one party impose costs on others. One of the rationales
offered by Dunham went directly to Coase’s negotiation result, and
his explanation instanced Sturges v. Bridgman,246 one of the legal
cases taken up by Coase to illustrate his result. The issue in Sturges v.
Bridgman revolved around the noise and vibration emanating from
the mortar and pestle used by a confectionary, which interfered with a
neighboring physician’s ability to practice medicine.247 In spite of the
interference that the confectionary’s activity caused to the physician’s
practice, the judge did not declare the offending activity a nuisance.248
One possible explanation for this “judicial reluctance to develop the
law of nuisance,” Dunham argued, was
judicial recognition of the economic fact that the appropriate mixture of doctoring and confectioning could be obtained by society
without any law of nuisance. Bargains between neighboring property owners could take place which, according to conventional eco246. Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852, (1883), 32 Reports of Cases Decided by the English Courts 837.
247. Id. at 853.
248. Id. at 862–63.
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nomic theory, would, on the whole, allocate resources to candymaking and doctoring most economically.249

That is, Dunham was suggesting that judges may, in effect, have anticipated the insights underlying the Coase theorem.250 Dunham offered
no evidence to support this conjecture, but he obviously considered it
likely that agents involved in conflicting use disputes would bargain
“in the shadow of the law” if placed in an environment that encouraged such behavior and, moreover, that judges would have expected them to do precisely this.251
Coase’s negotiation result was also employed to provide a justification of governmental takings of private property, an application that is
attended by no small amount of irony, given the anti-regulatory bias
that is often attached to the Coase theorem. In fact, this argument
was made twice in the late 1960s—first by Harvard Law School professor Frank Michelman in his now classic article, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, published in the Harvard Law Review in 1967,252 and again
two years later in Stanford Law School professor Douglas Ayer’s article, Allocating the Costs of Determining “Just Compensation”, published in the Stanford Law Review.253 Interestingly, while both
Michelman and Ayer utilized Coase’s negotiation result in their analysis, their emphasis was on the juxtaposition of this result with Coase’s
discussion of the problems with negotiated solutions.254
As Michelman pointed out, Coase’s negotiation result has interesting implications for the analysis of regulatory takings. If the government attempts to justify a regulation as efficiency-enhancing, said
Michelman,255 this implies that B—the beneficiary of the regulation—
gains more than A—the regulated party—loses. But if that is the case,
he noted:
249. Dunham, supra note 210, at 135.
250. Id. The other possible rationale mentioned by Dunham also drew on Coase.
In language virtually identical to that used by Coase, Dunham suggested that the reluctance to broaden the law of nuisance could have been because judges understood
the reciprocal nature of harm and its implications—that one cannot label any particular party as the cause of the harm. See Dunham, Promises, supra note 210, at 134–35;
Coase, supra note 1, at 2. Further evidence for Coase’s influence on Dunham comes
from the fact that Dunham also noted, as Coase had done, that a single owner of
affected parcels of land would also efficiently resolve the problem. See Dunham,
Promises, supra note 210, at 137–38.
251. See Dunham, Promises, supra note 210, at 135.
252. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1176 n.23 (1967).
Michelman received his LL.B. from Harvard Law School. Id. at 1165.
253. Douglas Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining “Just Compensation,” 21
STAN. L. REV. 693 (1969). Ayer received his LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1962. Id.
at 693.
254. See generally Michelman, supra note 252; Ayer, supra note 253.
255. Michelman, supra note 252, at 1175.
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It might, then, be argued that the [regulatory] measure is unnecessary because, if its premises are sound, we should expect the neighbors to offer A an acceptable sum in return for his agreement to
cooperate. Conversely, the very fact that no such transaction has
spontaneously evolved may be said to prove that A’s operation . . . is efficient.256

Coase’s negotiation result, then, suggests that takings are inefficient
because all efficiency-enhancing moves would already have been
made. Michelman’s response was that Coase’s result is “imperfect”
because various impediments to the smoothly functioning negotiation
process envisioned by Coase’s result—including strategic behavior by
those involved and “the side costs of drafting agreements, checking on
their legality, and so forth”—may preclude successful negotiation,
even if the taking is transferring resources to a higher-valued use.257
Because these impediments prevent the parties from reaching an
agreement, said Michelman, “a government’s regulatory activity may
claim an efficiency justification.”258 Thus, where Coase had shown
that regulatory remedies were unnecessary in a world of zero transaction costs, Michelman argued that, through its negation, his negotiation result provided a rationale for the need for government
regulation, including takings, in order to promote efficiency.259
While Michelman had argued that regulatory takings may be efficient—that the Coase theorem cannot, a priori, provide the basis for
an argument that they are not—Ayer, who had been a student of Calabresi’s at Yale,260 went the further step of suggesting that the existence of eminent-domain power was an efficient response to the
problems associated with consummating Coasean bargains in cases
where government wished to acquire private land for public purposes.
Ayer’s rationale for this belief, interestingly enough, was grounded in
the primacy of the market.261 He noted that the law of eminent-domain “allows condemnors to substitute a judicial proceeding for a
market transaction as a means of acquiring property.”262 Yet, he continued, given that the market is the usual mechanism for transferring
property in the U.S., why is it in some cases “rejected in favor of that
effected by the eminent domain power”?263
256. Id. at 1175.
257. Id. at 1175–76. Michelman noted that Coase himself had pointed to certain of
these impediments, and he also mentioned problems related to coordinating members
of an affected group to bargain in such situations, citing Calabresi, The Decision for
Accidents, supra note 5; ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
173–74 (1957).
258. Michelman, supra note 252, at 1175.
259. See generally id.
260. Letter from Calabresi, supra note 154.
261. Ayer, supra note 253, at 693.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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To answer this question, Ayer took as his example a situation in
which the government wishes to undertake a large public-works project, one that entails the acquisition of several parcels of property.264
The property owners, he said, may see the opportunity for windfall
gains from this process and so respond by over-stating the value of
their property.265 Their goal, Ayer argued, is to get as large a windfall
as possible without setting the price so high that the government abandons its plan to purchase the party’s land for the project.266 Invoking
Calabresi’s 1968 discussion of Coase’s result, and employing language
strikingly similar to that of Calabresi, Ayer argued:
If there were no transaction costs, no legal impediments to bargaining, and the windfall-seeking condnmees [sic] were all rational, they
could work out among themselves a contractual arrangement that
would ensure that their demands did not exceed, individually or in
the aggregate, the monopoly tolls that the condemnor could pay and
still benefit from the public improvement.267

Like Michelman, then, Ayer was arguing that the Coase theorem implies that the use of eminent-domain power is unnecessary.268
It was only in answering his “why not the market?” question that
Ayer finally invoked Coase directly, but his focus was on Coase’s discussion of transaction costs and their impacts rather than on the
smoothly operating negotiation process of the Coase theorem.269
What Ayer took from this was that “transaction costs and perhaps also
irrational condemnees who could not perceive the advantage of entering into such an arrangement” would pose significant problems when
it came to arriving at negotiation solutions to these government
purchases.270 To overcome these problems and achieve an efficiencyenhancing resource transfer, Ayer said, “some form of governmental
264. Id. at 694.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 696. See also Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 129, at 68, quoted
supra p. 26.
268. Ayer, supra note 253, at 696.
269. Id. at 696. See also Coase, supra note 1, at 17–18.
270. Ayer, supra note 253, at 696. Ayer’s discussion of transaction costs closely
parallels Coase’s 1959 and 1960 treatments of the subject. Id. Ayer said that transaction costs here “include such items as identifying the windfall-seeking condemnees,
getting them together, obtaining accurate information about the extent of the available windfalls, negotiating each party’s share in the monopoly tolls the condemnor
would pay, and so forth.” Id. at 696 n.10. Yet he did not cite Coase here. Id. Windfall-seeking, more commonly known as rent-seeking in the economics literature, was
later argued to be a phenomena that invalidated the Coase theorem. Yet, Coase had
explicitly ruled out rent-seeking in his original statement of the assumptions attending
the negotiation result. See Culho Jung, Kerry Krutilla, W. K. Viscusi & Roy Boyd,
The Coase Theorem in a Rent-Seeking Society, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 259 (1995);
Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27
n.54 (1959); Steven G. Medema, Comment: The Coase Theorem, Rent Seeking, and the
Forgotten Footnote, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 177 (1997).
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coercion seems required,” and his view was that “the eminent-domain
power can be seen as serving this purpose.”271 That is, eminent-domain power facilitates the results associated with Coasean bargains in
instances where these bargains are not feasible and so works as a legal
rule that could be employed to “mimic the market” in situations
where the market performed sub-optimally. In essence, then, the
Coase theorem—and, in particular, the divergences between the real
world and the world contemplated by the Coase theorem—was being
used by Ayer to provide a rationale for the existence or evolution of
eminent-domain power.272
At the same time that Ayer was appealing to the Coase theorem to
justify government’s eminent-domain power, Gerald Wright was employing its logic in the area of legal procedure—to provide a justification for class-action lawsuits.273 Wright, a student at Stanford Law
School who was simultaneously pursuing a Ph.D. in economics,274 was
sympathetic to the basic efficiency-related goal of internalizing costs
and argued that class-action lawsuits may be an efficient response to a
situation in which the actions of one party impose costs on a host of
others, as in the case of a diffuse pollution externality. In making his
case for this position, Wright presented a lengthy explication and discussion—ranging over some twenty pages—of Coase’s analysis, the
most extensive by far in the legal literature to that point.275
Echoing a theme that was prominent in economists’ discussions of
Coase’s analysis during the 1960s,276 Wright said that Coase “seemed
to have . . . reaffirmed” the “efficacy of the free market” when he laid
out the negotiation result and its attendant invariance proposition,
along with his contention that, in the face of positive bargaining costs,
efforts to internalize costs by imposing them on those traditionally
seen as the cause of the harm “do not necessarily lead to an optimum
solution.”277 Though he found Coase’s negotiation analysis “useful”
as a demonstration of the idea that alternative assignments of rights
will not affect output levels, Wright also considered the argument “incomplete,” in that the presence of transaction costs would “preclude
any ‘bargaining’” for “most externalities,” meaning that the party to
whom rights are assigned would indeed impact the allocation of resources.278 The insight into Coase’s analysis provided by Wright’s ec271. Ayer, supra note 253, at 696.
272. Id.
273. Gerald A. Wright, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 383 (1969).
274. Wright had previously earned a B.A. in economics from Harvard. Gerald
A. Wright Memorial Fund, CHARITYSMITH, http://www.charitysmith.org/endeavors/g
wright/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
275. Wright, supra note 273, at 383–84.
276. See Medema, Rethinking Market Failure, supra note 4.
277. Wright, supra note 273, at 386.
278. Id.
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onomics training appears to be on display in his assessment of the
problems posed by transaction costs. Wright argued that even the
slightest transaction costs, as distinct, for example, from the larger information problems, etc. pointed to by the torts commentators, could
derail Coase’s negotiation result:
The crucial assumption at this stage of the analysis is that bargaining
is costless—that there are no lawyers, arbitrators, cost-benefit
studiers, or others to reduce the amounts of money that can be
transferred among the parties. In fact, if any amount of economic
energy is spent on the bargaining process, there has been a cost that
will prevent the parties from reaching the theoretical optimum.
Since bargaining is usually difficult and costly, it is necessary to determine what effect that difficulty will have on the efficient use of
resources.279

Wright’s concern about even the smallest of transaction costs stood in
stark contrast to those of many other legal commentators, who were
willing to countenance Coase’s result, even in the presence of positive,
but low, levels of such costs.280
What, then, does all of this have to do with class-action lawsuits?
Wright noted that when transaction costs are positive, one definition
of rights may be more likely than others to facilitate bargaining.281 If,
for example, there is a single polluter and several parties who are
harmed by the pollution, negotiations are more likely to be initiated if
the victims are given the right to be free from harm. The polluter will
then have an incentive to initiate negotiations with the victims to
reach a mutually-beneficial settlement. If the polluter was instead
granted the right to continue with its emissions, it would be more difficult for the several victims to coordinate the initiation of negotiations.282 The benefit of allowing class-action lawsuits, said Wright, is
that the class-action collapses the externality to two parties283 and, in
the process, “reduces bargaining costs between the polluter and the
279. Id. at 388.
280. Id. The problems with the bargaining solution were not limited, for Wright, to
transaction costs. Again drawing on his economics training, Wright invoked the work
of economists F.T. Dolbear and E.J. Mishan to argue that, even when bargaining is
costless, if consumers are party to the externality, income effects will generate different efficient outcomes, depending on to which party rights are initially assigned, and
thus who has to pay the bribes to whom. See id. at 386–98; F.T. Dolbear, On the
Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 90 (1967); E. J. Mishan, Pareto
Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 255 (1967). See also Steven G.
Medema, 1966 and All That: Codification, Consolidation, Creep, and Controversy in
the Early History of The Coase Theorem, 36 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 271 (2014);
Medema & Zerbe, supra note 12 (discussing this literature).
281. Wright, supra note 273, at 398. This, as we have seen, was a point that Calabresi had emphasized and that eventually gave rise to the idea known as the “normative Coase theorem.”
282. Id. at 403–04. Calabresi had previously pointed to problems with free-riding
behavior in a Coase theorem context. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
283. Wright, supra note 273, at 398.
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pollutees, and also among the pollutees themselves.”284 Wright did
not suggest, at this point, that it makes no difference to which party
rights are assigned since, even in a class-action situation, transaction
costs are at best reduced, not eliminated.285 Rather, he believed that,
where rights are assigned to the victims, the parties are more likely to
negotiate as Coase contemplated. Again, the logic behind this argument is that it is easier for the single party to initiate negotiations.286
Coase’s negotiation result, then, provided the rationale for Wright’s
defense of class actions, which can be seen as an efficient procedural
response to the existence of significant transaction costs and one that
can facilitate the Coasean negotiation process, just as, at the hands of
Michelman and Ayer, it provided a rationale for eminent-domain
power and regulatory takings. In each case, the legal measure in question was described as an efficient or efficiency-enhancing response to
the presence of costly negotiation—the one significant difference being that, for Wright, the effect was to stimulate negotiation à la Coase
rather than to provide a “regulatory” alternative to negotiation
failure.
VII. TRACKING THE COASE THEOREM: MYTHOLOGIES
CHICAGO AND OF ECONOMICS IMPERIALISM

OF

To this point, this Article has devoted a good deal of effort addressing the question of how Coase’s negotiation result was treated by legal
scholars during the 1960s. What this Article has not examined in any
significant way is the question of how the Coase theorem gained traction—that is, by what processes or mechanisms this idea was diffused
into the legal community, garnering more and more references and
discussions as the decade wore on, and what this tells us about the
early history of the economic analysis of law. This history is typically
told as a Chicago story, though one in which Yale played a role, and it
is also often characterized as an early instance of “economics imperialism,” with “Chicago school” economists and fellow travelers attempting to infuse legal analysis with economic thinking and even to
colonize the field. While there can be no doubt that the Coase theorem is most closely associated in the professional mind with the “Chicago school” and with the “economics imperialism” that emanated in
part from Chicago, the study of its diffusion into the legal literature
suggests that there is a significant element of myth in each of these
traditional stories.
With respect to the “economics imperialism” question, when it
came to applying the Coase theorem to legal issues, the economists
284. Id. at 403.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 404.
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were almost nowhere to be found during the 1960s.287 Though they
were busy discussing various implications of Coase’s analysis, including the negotiation result, for the theory of and policy making related
to externalities, they were not applying the Coase theorem to issues
that would traditionally fall into the legal realm. While the economists were to join the legal fray not long after the period examined
here, the fact is that it was the lawyers who were leading the charge in
bringing the Coase theorem into legal analysis—including using it as a
justification for the adoption of legal rules that would satisfy the dictates of efficiency—during the 1960s.
As Table 1 (below) makes clear, the story of how the Coase theorem wove its way into the legal literature is also far from being a Chicago-centric story. In terms of the raw data, there were far more
references to Coase’s negotiation result outside of Chicago than
within it. Coase’s result was treated in roughly equal measure by individuals affiliated with Chicago, Yale, and Stanford—with smattering
of attention from scholars at other institutions. And, as one can
gather from the previous discussion, it is fair to say that the Chicago
treatments, taken as a group, were not significantly more enthusiastic
about the theorem than those coming from scholars at other
schools.288 But even this data is misleading, in that it masks the chains
of influence that reveal the true importance of Yale—and Calabresi in
particular—in the Coase theorem’s diffusion.
There can be no question that, when it comes to the published record at least, Calabresi was the foremost exponent of the Coase theorem among legal scholars during the 1960s.289 That he was an
economics undergraduate who received his legal education at an institution with a significant Realist-infused law and economics heritage
287. See Medema, Rethinking Market Failure, supra note 4; Medema, supra note
154 for discussions of how economists treated Coase’s negotiation result during the
1960s. Suffice it to say that the economists were not applying the theorem to issues
that traditionally fell into the legal realm.
288. Interestingly, individuals with close connections to three schools—Chicago,
Virginia, and the London School of Economics—were responsible for a significant
proportion of the citations to Coase’s analysis within economics in the first half of the
1960s. It should also be noted that there were five other references to Coase’s article
that, directly or indirectly, emanated from the Law School at Chicago during this
period, but none of them discuss Coase’s negotiation result. See Harold P. Green,
Technology Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1033 (1968); David P. Currie, Review of Water Law, Planning & Policy (Cases
and Materials), by Joseph L. Sax, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1811 (1968); David P. Currie, The
Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268 (1969);
Note, Federal Regulation of Air Transportation and the Environmental Impact Problem, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1968); G. E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, Cost-Benefit in
Court, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 83 (1969).
289. Only economists James Buchanan of the University of Virginia and Harold
Demsetz of the University of Chicago come close to matching Calabresi when it
comes to the number of treatments of Coase’s negotiation result in the 1960s, but they
were working on topics more traditionally “economic” in nature. See, e.g., Demsetz,
supra note 135.
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certainly accounted for some, if not much, of Calabresi’s willingness to
engage, countenance, and even embrace Coase’s negotiation result.
His coursework in tort law and the economic ring that certain questions of tort law had for him gave Calabresi the stimulus to develop a
deterrence-based approach to accidents grounded in economic logic.
The legacies of scholars such as Thurman Arnold and Walton Hamilton, both of whom emphasized the significant nexus between law and
economics, made Yale a receptive environment for working out these
ideas.290
Calabresi’s influence goes much further than this, however, for
there can be little question that much of the use of Coase’s analysis at
and beyond Yale during this period was attributable, directly or indirectly, to Calabresi. His several articles treating Coase’s result exposed many scholars to it, but as Table 1 illustrates, the chain of
influence here goes far beyond other scholars reading through Calabresi’s articles and deciding to incorporate Coase’s insight into their
own analysis. Ayer and Onek, for example, were Calabresi’s students,
and Onek spoke explicitly of the substantial debt that his analysis
owed to Calabresi.291 Calabresi’s influence is further exemplified in
the propensity for Yale-associated authors to cite Calabresi more
prominently than Coase when discussing the negotiation result (with
the reverse holding for scholars associated with Chicago). Given that
it was Calabresi, and not Coase, who was making regular use of the
negotiation idea and of Coase’s contribution,292 it may also be that,
inside and outside of Yale, Calabresi was as closely identified with
Coase’s result at that time as was Coase himself—particularly as this
result had not yet come to be widely known as the “Coase
theorem.”293
Moving a (half) step beyond Yale, it is almost certainly Calabresi’s
influence that explains what is perhaps the most surprising element of
this data—the significant number of references to the Coase theorem
that came out of Stanford during this period. Franklin, who taught
torts at Stanford during the 1960s, kept up with the output of his good
friend Calabresi and encountered Coase’s analysis through Calabresi’s
debate with Blum and Kalven—the articles from which, along with
Coase’s article, are cited in his 1965 analysis of products liability.294
Ayer, who graduated from Yale Law School in 1962 and was a student
of Calabresi’s during his time there, joined the Stanford faculty in
290. Interview, supra note 21.
291. Onek, supra note 152, at 603.
292. Coase did not publish another word on this subject during the 1960s.
293. It is also noteworthy that we observe in this literature the Yale tendency to
move quickly to a focus on the influence of transaction costs and attendant (positive)
implications for government intervention—a position that was to distinguish the Yale
law and economics approach from the Chicago approach in the coming years.
294. Letter from Franklin, supra note 154. See also Franklin, When Worlds Collide,
supra note 152, at 1005 n.183.
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1967. It is likely, then, that it was Franklin and Ayer—and thus, in
directly, Calabresi—who were responsible for exposing Stanford students Atwood, Childs, and Wright—all of whose articles were published in 1969—to Coase’s negotiation result.295
The one other piece of interesting information that emerges from
this contextual analysis is that students at Chicago, Yale, and Stanford
were being exposed to the Coase theorem. The law reviews of all
three schools featured student notes making reference to Coase’s result during the late 1960s—one at Chicago and two apiece at Yale and
Stanford. This is not to say that the students were being “taught” the
Coase theorem; we have no records of student class notes that would
support such a claim, though retrospective comments by Chicago students suggest that the theorem was being taught at Chicago, at
least.296 As for the Yale and Stanford students—Woodward, Onek,
Atwood, and Wright—it may simply be that they encountered the theorem in the research done for their respective articles. But it seems
likely that the students first encountered Coase’s result in their
courses—perhaps in reading the debates between Blum and Kalven
and Calabresi, though it is possible that the students were also asked
to read Coase. But they were being exposed to Coase’s result and
took it seriously enough to incorporate it into their own scholarship.
The fact that Childs, a student at Stanford, considered this result “a
well-accepted proposition” speaks to the inroads that the Coase theorem was making in legal training.297

295. Ayer was at that time “interested in seeing how economic theory could be
used to address legal problems,” though it was not long before his focus shifted to the
study of legal history. Letter from Douglas Ayer to Steven Medema (Sept. 6, 2012)
(on file with author). See also Douglas Ayer, In Quest of Efficiency: The Ideological
Journey of Thurman Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1971).
One other possible line of influence here is Aaron Director, who arrived at the
Hoover Institution in 1965 and also had an office at the Stanford Law School. It was
Director who accepted Coase’s article for publication in the Journal of Law and Economics, helped to recruit him to the Law School at Chicago, and first called Calabresi’s attention to Coase’s work. It is not beyond the realm of possibility, then, that
Director played a role in the diffusion of Coase’s ideas at Stanford, but there is no
evidence to support this.
296. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School
Tradition, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 5 (2010).
297. Childs, supra note 235, at 1710.
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TABLE 1
LAWYERS CITING COASE’S NEGOTIATION RESULT

Name

Year

Affiliation

Education

Calabresi
Tree

Atwood298

1969

Stanford*

Stanford

+

Ayer

1969

Stanford

Yale

+

Blum & Kalven 1964 etc. Chicago

Chicago

Bowman

1966

Vanderbilt (Econ.)

+

Calabresi

1964 etc. Yale

Yale

+

Childs

1969

Stanford

+

Yale
Stanford*

Christensen

1968

Chicago*

Chicago

Dunham

1965

Chicago

Columbia

Woodward

1968

Yale*

Yale

+

Franklin

1966

Stanford

Cornell

+

Katz

1969

Harvard

Harvard

Keeton

1969

Texas

Texas

Kessler

1967

Yale

Berlin

Kitch

1968

Chicago

Chicago

Michelman

1967

Harvard

Harvard

Onek

1967

Fed Appeals Ct Clerk

Yale

Pasley

1969

Cornell

Cornell

Weiler

1967

Toronto

Toronto

Wright

1969

Stanford*

Stanford

+

+

+

Affiliations**
Chicago

4

Yale

5

Stanford

5

* Student.
**These affiliations mask the fact that Bowman and Kessler (1938–47) had previously taught
at Chicago and Ayer did his law degree at Yale in the early 1960s. Onek is counted for Yale
because the article was written while he was a student at Yale Law School and published only
months following his graduation.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Although Ronald Coase noted much later in his career that his
work in law and economics was targeted at economists and that he
had “no interest in lawyers or in legal education,”299 legal scholars
were quick to pick up on the implications of his negotiation result for
legal analysis. One message that emerges from this history is the
overly simplistic nature of stories that attempt to paint the origins of
the economic analysis of law within the frame of “economics imperial298. See, infra note 300.
299. Kitch, supra note 2, at 192.
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ism.” The diffusion of Coase’s negotiation result into the legal literature and legal analysis generally was the product of a work
undertaken by legal scholars, largely outside of the University of Chicago, who were bringing economic analysis, including Coase’s result,
to bear on a wide range of legal issues. Calabresi’s role in all of this
was central, of course, but his message did not fall on deaf ears. The
“revolution” that the economic analysis of law engendered was still
some years off, but the idea that economic analysis could inform legal
thinking was beginning to gather steam within the legal community,
and the Coase theorem was very much bound up within these formative steps.
One of the most notable aspects of the 1960s discussions of Coase’s
negotiation result is that the legal scholars who took it up appear to
have accepted its basic theoretical validity. With only two exceptions
(one—Calabresi’s—soon recanted), the objections raised went not to
whether Coase’s conclusion followed logically from his assumptions,
but instead were made on other grounds—mainly relevance/applicability and justice/equity. Most legal scholars at this time were not
equipped to debate technical points of economics and perhaps, as a
result, did not feel themselves qualified to challenge the economist’s
authority on this theoretical front, even as they did question the Coase
theorem’s applicability to the legal issues with which they were grappling.300 But then, even the economists themselves had raised very
little in the way of theoretical objections to Coase’s result during the
first half of the 1960s,301 so in that respect the reaction within the legal
community was not so different from that within economics. Though
the state of play on this front would change dramatically during the
1970s, the perceived correctness of Coase’s result circa the late 1960s
300. The only other challenge (besides Calabresi’s) to the theorem’s theoretical validity that was raised in the legal literature during this period came from Stanford law
student James Atwood, and the nature of Atwood’s challenge is indicative of why
lawyers may have been reluctant to challenge the economist on technical points of
economic theory, such as those underlying the Coase theorem. In it, Atwood argued
that Coase’s claim, that outcomes would be independent of initial assignments of liability in a world of costless transacting, was in error because it failed to account for
one class of cases: “When the harm to a sensitive use is less than would be the cost of
the offending user’s eliminating the offensive part of his use, the ultimate result will
depend very much on whether liability is imposed. If the offensive user is not liable
he will continue his use totally unaffected by the sensitive users harm. Only if he is
found liable will there be an adjustment among the parties.” James R. Atwood, An
Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REV. 293, 298 n.18 (1969).
Atwood’s argument, however, was off base. If the offending party is not liable, the
victim will indeed continue to suffer the damages, as Atwood pointed out. Id. But if
the offending party is made liable, he will not, as Atwood implies, cease to engage in
the offending acts. Rather, since the damage done is less than the cost of mitigation,
the offending party will bribe the victim to allow him to continue to engage in the
offending act, since that is the course of action that provides the offending party and
the victim with the greatest net benefit.
301. See Medema, Rethinking Market Failure, supra note 4, at 1–2.
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left only the issue of real-world applicability standing between the
Coase theorem and law’s irrelevance.
The lawyers’ skepticism about translating Coase’s insight to the real
world was driven by the belief that there are likely to be various impediments, often serious, to a smoothly functioning negotiation or
market process—impediments that now fall under the vast umbrella
of transaction costs. It is noteworthy that, though Coase himself had
assumed that the costs of transacting are zero when fashioning his negotiation result, there was a willingness among legal scholars during
this period to break from Coase’s assumption and to allow that the
results contemplated by the Coase theorem could obtain in the presence of at least some positive level of such costs. But even with this
allowance, the perception was that the actual magnitude of these costs
in the real world would tend to pose an insuperable barrier to
Coasean solutions in many, if not most, instances—though, as we have
seen, the opinions here were by no means uniform.
The relevant question points us to what is perhaps the most distinctive feature of the lawyers’ discussion of Coase’s negotiation result
during the 1960s: it focused largely on the issue of invariance, with
relatively little attention paid to questions of efficiency. This makes
for an interesting contrast with the economists who, during this same
period, were focused almost solely on the Coase theorem’s efficiency
proposition and gave relatively little attention to the invariance issue.302 The explanation for this dichotomy almost certainly lies in the
respective concerns of these two groups. Economists, as we have
noted, did not see in Coase’s analysis an alternative lens through
which to view questions of legal theory; indeed, outside of antitrust
and certain regulatory matters, the economists of this period paid
scant attention to legal issues.303 What the economists saw, instead,
was a challenge to the Pigovian tradition in the economic theory of
externalities (Coase’s intended target), which viewed direct government intervention—e.g., taxing or regulating the offending activity—
as necessary to achieve efficient resource allocation. Coase had argued that these instruments are unnecessary for the attainment of efficiency, at least in the frictionless world of neoclassical economics on
which the Pigovian analysis was based. For economists enamored
with Coase’s result, then, the ability of private action to generate an
efficient resolution of externality problems was the big prize at this
time, and the idea that the outcome would be invariant across alternative legal-rights structures was of decidedly lesser importance.
In contrast, the focus of the legal scholars was on issues germane to
law, including the instrumental question of the impacts associated
302. Medema, supra note 280.
303. It was not always so, as a glance at the law and economics literature of the
inter-war period reveals. This was the heyday of American institutional economics,
which had close links with Legal Realism.
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with alternative legal rules—that is, how and why law matters. One
could certainly argue—and Calabresi did—that efficiency concerns
should be one aspect of this analysis. But the economic analysis of
law was still very much in its infancy during this period, and efficiency
was not prominently on the radar of legal scholars. It was in its suggestion that the particulars of law are, in essence, irrelevant (the invariance claim) that Coase’s result posed a significant challenge to
traditional legal thinking. Interestingly, those lawyers who did broach
the subject of efficiency were almost always those who had an economics background—Calabresi being only the most prominent example. And in some ways, at least, this law–economics dichotomy
remains in place, as evidenced in recent conversations between the
present author and two individuals who have long and intimate associations with the Chicago school tradition—one an economist and
the other a legal scholar.304 The economist argued that the Coase theorem is all about the efficiency proposition, and that the invariance
issue is a “red herring.” The legal scholar asserted just the opposite—
that the main message of the Coase theorem is the invariance proposition. All of this is indicative of the rather different messages that different audiences took from the Coase theorem during the 1960s and
continue to take from it today.
When it came to the particulars of Coase’s negotiation result, two
aspects of the legal discussion stand out. First, as already noted, the
legal scholars were willing to countenance Coase’s result in the presence of some positive level of transaction costs. Second, as emphasized in the discussion of products liability, Coase’s result was seen as
the basis for the claim that, in theory, markets would internalize relevant costs in invariant fashion when the parties involved are in an existing contractual or market relationship. Each of these claims
marked a departure from Coase’s own discussion, a fact of which the
authors seem to have been unaware. Beyond that, however, the former claim suggests a version of Coase’s result that does not pass the
test of economic logic while the latter is oblivious to the long-standing
acceptance of the pre-existing bargaining case result. It is tempting to
ascribe these moves to the authors’ lack of familiarity with the details
of economic theory. But whatever the underlying explanation, the
fact remains that these larger classes of legal–economic interactions
were now identified with Coase’s result and so had the effect of
broadening the domain of issues to which the Coase theorem was said
to apply. And given the almost universally accepted elementary-price
theory underlying the pre-existing bargaining result, this may have
had the further effect of solidifying the confidence in the theoretical
correctness of Coase’s insight.
304. These comments emerged in e-mail conversations with these two scholars during 2012. We will preserve their anonymity here.
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While some of these details may strike the reader as just so much
minutia, they are actually important moments in Coase theorem history. The theorem was inching its way onto the legal landscape,305
with an imprint that extended well beyond Chicago—though the
boundaries during this period remained fairly narrow when compared
with the phenomenon that the theorem became over the course of the
next decade. The treatment accorded to transaction costs; the envelopment of the pre-existing bargaining situations into the Coase theorem’s domain; the respective efficiency–invariance emphases of
economists and lawyers; and the set of problems that Coase’s analysis
was used to address, reveal unmistakably that the Coase theorem was
not a “result” that was simply lifted from the pages of The Problem of
Social Cost and analyzed and applied by other scholars. Instead, it
was an idea whose meaning and content, range, and domain were being worked out during this formative period.
305. The inroads that the Coase theorem was making into legal thinking is perhaps
best evidenced by a situation in which it was not applied—an article by G.E. Hale and
Rosemary D. Hale in the George Washington Law Review on the use of cost-benefit
analysis in the courts. G.E. Hale, a graduate of Harvard and University of Chicago
Law Schools and Rosemary Hale, a lecturer in economics at Lake Forest College,
discussed United States v. Container Corporation of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969),
from which emerged a court finding that price communication between competing
firms was unlawful. In their discussion of this case, Hale and Hale noted that because
information acquisition was unlikely to be attended by externalities, private and social
cost are likely to be identical in this case and, as such, it was “therefore unnecessary to
consider application of the Coase theorem which states that private and social costs
are the same regardless of ‘externalities.’” Hale & Hale, supra note 288, at 87 n.21.
That Hale and Hale would even mention that they need not bring in the Coase theorem suggests the extent to which the theorem was becoming part of legal analysis. See
generally id.

